appConfigEntityId

bodyType

customContents

entityId

entityUuid

isVideo

articlePageQuery

article

articleSchemaContent

content

hooksArticlePageAdvertisementConfigArticle

hooksArticlePageFloatingButtonConfigArticle

appConfig

filter

json

liveArticle

Lucio Blanco Pitlo III

Escalating clashes in the South China Sea between the Philippines and China have not only raised the urgency of a regional Code of Conduct but have created a volatile environment where the threshold for war is lowering and red lines are vanishing.
As diplomatic efforts stall, the fraught ties between Manila and Beijing are creating a complex crisis defined by six key risks, ranging from the normalisation of violent skirmishes to a dangerous entanglement with cross-strait tensions.
First, there is the palpable danger of lowering the threshold for open conflict.
In a speech at a premier defence forum, the Shangri-La Dialogue security conference in Singapore in May 2024, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jnr said the death of any Filipino by a wilful act in the disputed waters could be considered close to an act of war.
Strong signalling aside, such a warning inadvertently lowers the bar for conflict. It contrasts with the restrained rhetoric used by Beijing and New Delhi during their fatal 2020 encounter in the Galwan Valley, which resulted in the deaths of at least 20 Indian soldiers and four Chinese personnel.
Marcos’ remark was almost tested the following month, when a violent incident erupted at the Second Thomas Shoal involving Filipino and Chinese sailors.

At least eight Philippine Navy personnel were injured – with one losing a thumb – in the skirmish, and it marked the first time Chinese authorities had boarded a Philippine government boat.
Following reports of damage to inflatable boats and theft, Manila last year reiterated its demand for the return of seized firearms and personal items, as well as compensation for the damage.
Second, a perilous new normal is taking shape across the waterway.
Both sides appear to be accepting an elevated risk of miscalculation stemming from increased sea and air incidents.
From unsafe manoeuvres and swarming to water cannon blasting and physical altercations, these encounters are setting volatile new precedents. Drills and sails with allies and partners in the flashpoint have also spiked.
In 2024, a stand-off occurred at Sabina Shoal, a low-tide elevation 75 nautical miles (139km) from Palawan. The five-month deadlock brought supplies to a critical low for the BRP Teresa Magbanua, one of the Philippine coastguard’s largest and most modern vessels deployed in the area.
Last August, a China coastguard cutter and a People’s Liberation Army Navy destroyer collided 10.5 nautical miles east of Scarborough Shoal while allegedly pursuing a Philippine resupply mission to local fishers operating in the reef.
In October, Manila also reported the closest ever Chinese presence to Thitu island, locally known as Pagasa island, the country’s largest administered feature in the Spratlys.
According to Philippine officials, a Chinese flotilla composed of maritime militia, coastguard and navy assets had come as close as 1.6 to 1.8 nautical miles of the feature in an attempt to interfere with a supply run to Filipino fishers.


On Manila’s part, close ally the United States has been granted an expanded military footprint.
A Reciprocal Access Agreement with Japan entered into force last September, while an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement was signed this January.
Visiting forces pacts were also signed with New Zealand and Canada, alongside stepped-up joint exercises with Australia.
While seen as vital to enhancing Philippine deterrence, such combined sails and drills have increased the chances of accidents between US and allied aircraft and ships and their Chinese peers.
This reality demands more robust communication and crisis management mechanisms.
Third, new facts on the ground are being established while red lines are being challenged.
Last September, Beijing declared Scarborough Shoal a national marine reserve – a move Manila protested.
Since a tense stand-off in 2012, China has wrested physical control of the feature, posting a coastguard ship almost year-round.
However, the September announcement could prove to be an irreversible game changer.
Construction in the disputed shoal represents a red line for Manila.
The removal of the BRP Sierra Madre – Manila’s beached outpost on Second Thomas Shoal – is another red line that came into focus with the sighting of a Chinese tugboat in the shoal last August.

Newly emerged features, such as Sandy Cay near Philippine-administered Pagasa, are also becoming fresh points of contention.
Fourth is the risk of setting a low bar for victory for the Philippines.
Transparency is a tool rather than a strategy.
Headlining intrusions into its waters or airspace, highlighting statements of support from allies and advertising more joint activities at sea are crucial to bolstering Manila’s case and securing legitimacy at home and abroad.
But questions remain as to whether this constitutes Manila’s endgame.
With Malaysia exploiting offshore petroleum and Vietnam’s reclamation in the Spratlys potentially surpassing China’s, Manila should not settle for merely trading barbs and claiming the legal high ground.
Fifth is the danger of deepening distrust that is affecting even normal people-to-people ties by securitising and stigmatising academic and think-tank exchanges.
Frequent run-ins are breeding Filipino contempt for China. The clash between “megaphone” diplomacy and “wolf warrior” tactics only serves to sow more animosity and complicate real diplomacy.
Finally, the brewing South China Sea spat is being inextricably linked to another regional hotspot: the Taiwan Strait.
The US has been granted greater strategic access in the northern Philippines.
A mid-range missile system was indefinitely stationed in northern Luzon facing Taiwan.
The Typhon system’s range covers not only the Luzon Strait and Taiwan but also parts of mainland China, prompting a strong reaction from Beijing.
Aligning with America in preparing for a possible Taiwan contingency is viewed by Beijing as interference in its domestic affairs, further straining already worn ties.
Strengthening its defence posture while desiring not to see force employed to alter the status quo across the Taiwan Strait – without violating the One China Policy – would be a demanding balancing act for Manila.
Lucio Blanco Pitlo III is president of the Philippine Association for Chinese Studies and research fellow at the Asia-Pacific Pathways to Progress Foundation.


Why younger Filipinos are warming to China despite maritime tensions

Why Brunei prefers ‘quiet diplomacy’ over confrontation in South China Sea

Collision near Sabina Shoal sparks fresh escalation between China and the Philippines

Teodoro for president? Philippine defence chief draws 2028 election buzz after China clash

China-Philippines relations

South China Sea: 6 risks facing Philippines and China as conflict threshold lowers

A China Coast Guard vessel (right) fires its water cannon at the Philippines’ BRP Datu Pagbuaya near Philippine-occupied Thitu island, locally called Pagasa island, in the disputed the South China Sea on October 12, 2025. Photo: Philippine Coast Guard via AP

Philippine President Marcos Jnr addresses an August 2025 press conference in Manila on flood control, ongoing investigations and the country’s sovereignty in the South China Sea. Photo: EPA

A Philippine flag flies from the BRP Sierra Madre, a grounded Navy ship serving as a military outpost on Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea. Photo: Reuters

Philippines, France near defence pact to boost ‘operational intimacy’ in contested waters

Philippine Navy personnel aboard BRP Miguel Malvar during a naval exercise in the South China Sea in August 2025. Photo: Armed Forces of the Philippines, Public Affairs Office via AP

French Ambassador to the Philippines, Marie Fontanel, during the discussion on Tuesday. Photo: Raissa Robles

French Ambassador to the Philippines Marie Fontanel (left) with Brigadier General Guillaume Thomas, French Air Defence and Operations Command, at Clark airbase in the Philippines in July 2024. Photo: AFP

French Minister for the Armed Forces Sebastien Lecornu (left) with his Philippine counterpart Gilberto Teodoro during a joint press conference in Manila in December 2023. Photo: Pool via AP

Philippines steps up patrols around ‘significant’ gas find amid security concerns

Drilling of the Malampaya East-1 reservoir in Palawan province, Philippines, on January 19. Photo: Prime Energy via AP

The Malampaya natural gas field is the Philippines’ most important domestic energy source. Photo: Shell Philippines Exploration

President Ferdinand Marcos Jnr says Malampaya East-1 could strengthen the Philippines’ gas supply for many years to come. Photo: AP

South China Sea: claims of coercion, deception as Beijing and Manila wage new war of words

The Chinese coastguard is said to have fired water cannons at Philippine fishing boats near Sabina Shoal in the South China Sea in December. Photo: Handout

Japan, Philippines tighten ties with new defence pact amid China tensions

A Japanese naval ship docks at the Manila Port, Philippines, last year. Photo: EPA-EFE

Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi (left) and Philippine Foreign Secretary Theresa Lazaro shake hands after their joint press conference in Pasay City, Metro Manila, on Thursday. Photo: Reuters

This Week in Asia

Opinion

Asia Opinion

From violent incidents to US missiles in Luzon, a ‘perilous new normal’ and vanishing red lines threaten to derail the Code of Conduct


From violent incidents to US missiles in Luzon, a ‘perilous new normal’ and vanishing red lines threaten to derail the Code of Conduct.


South China Sea

The Philippines

Diplomacy

Defence

United States

Asean

Ferdinand Marcos Jnr

Japan

Canada

Taiwan

Australia

New Zealand

China

Philippine Navy

Expresses the views, ideas and conclusions of the author. (Eg. Enough of Crazy Rich Asians, think of crazy poor Hongkongers.)


Column

Asian Angle

.css-1c6uqr6{color:inherit;font-weight:inherit;font-size:inherit;font-family:inherit;line-height:inherit;overflow-wrap:break-word;}From violent incidents to US missiles in Luzon, a ‘perilous new normal’ and vanishing red lines threaten to derail the Code of Conduct

From violent incidents to US missiles in Luzon, a ‘perilous new normal’ and vanishing red lines threaten to derail the Code of Conduct