Wenran Jiang
Wenran Jiang, the founding director of the China Institute and Mactaggart Research Chair Emeritus at the University of Alberta, is an adviser at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy.
Wenran Jiang, the founding director of the China Institute and Mactaggart Research Chair Emeritus at the University of Alberta, is an adviser at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy.
Beijing’s response reflects a calculation that the deal’s fragility will soon show. Energy dominance is not seized by executive order – it is earned through capital, technology and time.
Japan’s latest defence white paper confirms Chinese strategists’ fears that post-war pacifist guard rails are being dismantled under the guise of ‘self-defence’.
Far from being able to take advantage of fissures among Western allies, China faces narrowing diplomatic options. But all leverage is not lost.
The Iran war may be remembered not just for who won or lost, but for how Beijing quietly altered the terms of great-power conduct.
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The Canadian doctor, hailed a hero in China, was driven by personal conviction; there are others today, tilling the soil of Sino-Canadian friendship.
Sanctions, diplomatic warnings and aggressive rhetoric create a perilous loop, reinforcing the very domestic tendencies China seeks to deter.
A region where US allies lose faith in Washington won’t necessarily embrace Beijing; it is a region more likely to reach for its own guns.
Far from freeing up resources to focus on China, Trump’s administration finds itself fighting fires on several fronts, sapping its resources.
Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney has offered a principled and pragmatic agenda for nations navigating a new era of great power rivalry.
Lessons from the first Sino-Japanese War in 1895 shape Beijing’s drive to build a PLA defined by not just advanced weapons, but also institutional integrity.
China not only forced a trade war backdown, it displayed its hi-tech military might from the waters off Australia to the skies near Japan.
Hawkish statements might placate the Japanese prime minister’s base, but they will only put Beijing on alert and risk isolating Tokyo.
If China backs down or fails to enforce its controls effectively, it will undermine this policy and cast doubt on other tools it wields.
Kim has ensured North Korea is no longer isolated. The question remains whether he can also overcome the country’s economic woes.
The call was not a thaw but an intervention to prevent a collapse of this vital relationship – a necessity imposed by geoeconomic realities.
The EU could have shown up to confront Putin and engage on Ukraine. China could have chosen true leadership over coalitions of convenience.
Centuries of shared identity, security integration and cultural allegiance bind these nations irreversibly to the US strategic architecture.
Instead of disengaging to focus on China, Trump’s America is more deeply involved in Europe’s defence and the Middle East than before.
Sabre-rattling might rally a domestic political base, but true statesmanship lies not in inviting disaster but in mastering its prevention.
As the US gambles on swift military might to advance its interests, China navigates a treacherous diplomatic landscape with hard choices.
It’s not just trade, tech, student visas and academic collaboration – the military stakes are rising too in this contest of endurance.
Beijing must juggle regional stability, global trade tensions and its standing as a responsible major power.
