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Maria Siow

Deep in the forested highlands of northern Myanmar, where the Irrawaddy River rises from two tributaries in the hills of Kachin state, a contentious infrastructure project is stirring again – and threatening to reopen wounds that never fully healed.
The Myitsone Dam, a US$3.6 billion Chinese-financed hydroelectric megaproject that was shelved more than a decade ago after igniting a storm of popular fury, is back on the table.
Myanmar’s military rulers have begun holding public consultations on resuming construction, a move analysts say risks a fresh confrontation with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), a powerful ethnic armed group that controls much of the surrounding territory.
The push to restart the project reportedly came on the heels of a high-profile visit to Naypyidaw in April by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who pledged deeper investment ties and support for the country’s newly formalised leadership.
Min Aung Hlaing – the general who led the coup that toppled Myanmar’s democratically elected government in February 2021, plunging his country into diplomatic isolation and civil war – was sworn in as president a little over two weeks before Wang’s visit.

Rebel resistance
When the Myitsone Dam was initially shelved, it represented a rare moment of political responsiveness in Myanmar. Thein Sein, another ex-general turned president, suspended the project in 2011 following a fierce backlash.
As first envisaged, 90 per cent of the 6,000-megawatt dam’s output was earmarked for export to China. Its reservoir, according to environmental impact assessments, would have submerged some 766 sq km (296 square miles) – an area roughly the size of Singapore – destroying local biodiversity and swallowing up cultural sites sacred to the Kachin people.
The pre-construction work alone, beginning in 2009, forced the relocation of around 12,000 residents, stripping them of their farmland and livelihoods, according to International Rivers and other advocacy groups.
“As with other major natural resource projects in Myanmar, the resources would be largely exported with the military regime and their cronies pocketing the rewards,” said Adam Simpson, a senior international studies lecturer at Adelaide University who specialises in Southeast Asian politics with a primary research focus on Myanmar and Thailand.

For the Kachin people, analysts say the dam represents foreign extraction underwritten by military force, to be carried out at the expense of an ethnic minority group with little say in the matter and everything to lose.
They are now almost “universally against” the project, according to Simpson, who sees little prospect of it advancing beyond preliminary works.
Standing in the way of the dam progressing is the KIA, one of Myanmar’s most battle-hardened and territorially entrenched ethnic armed organisations.
Formed in 1961 to fight for independence – since lessening its demands to greater autonomy – the KIA controls large swathes of Kachin state, including areas directly surrounding the proposed construction zone. It fiercely opposes the dam.
“Although the regime has recently intensified offensives against the KIA in the nearby rare earths-rich border area, they are unlikely to push back the KIA far enough to undertake the orderly construction of such a massive project,” Simpson said. “The dam construction site would provide an ideal target for asymmetric attacks and drone strikes.”
Hunter Marston, director for Southeast Asia at the Lowy Institute in Sydney, agreed that the KIA was a formidable obstacle, but argued that Min Aung Hlaing might be trying to shore up his political legitimacy with the project.
“If he can provide electricity and development to the people of Myanmar, he could portray himself as a reformer and a leader who can bring his country the economic development it desperately needs,” Marston said.
“Whether that bet will pay off is another question, and it could even be his downfall.”

Calculated risk
Much of what happens next may be determined less by Naypyidaw than by Beijing’s “risk tolerance”, analysts say.
China is Myanmar’s largest trading partner, its largest source of foreign investment and its most important political patron. A fuel crisis resulting from supply disruptions amid the US-Israel war on Iran has only deepened that dependence.
“Myanmar has always struggled with a weak electrical grid and military leaders have long looked to China’s investment in hydroelectric dams to fill the gap in its energy needs,” Marston said.
But Beijing’s approach to Myanmar’s ethnic borderlands has long been complex. China has frequently hosted KIA delegations in Yunnan province to urge restraint, secure the border and protect investments while simultaneously supporting the military-backed government in Naypyidaw.
Marston believes Min Aung Hlaing may be betting on a similar logic holding in Kachin state as has held, imperfectly, elsewhere.
In western Myanmar’s Rakhine state, for example, Chinese oil and gas pipelines and other infrastructure have been largely spared amid the civil war, as armed groups likely reason that striking Chinese assets risks bringing Beijing’s displeasure to bear against them.

“Min Aung Hlaing may calculate that once Chinese construction crews are on the ground, the fear of provoking a backlash from Beijing could prevent the KIA and PDFs from attacking Chinese infrastructure,” Marston said, referring to the armed wing of the government ousted by the coup, known as the People’s Defence Forces. “It will also come down to Beijing’s risk tolerance.”
The limits of that tolerance remain to be seen. Since the 2021 coup, both the KIA and PDFs have made territorial gains across the north of Myanmar, seizing lucrative rare earth mining zones and periodically disrupting cross-border trade with China.
China, meanwhile, remains the primary market for Kachin state’s jade, timber and gold, and this cross-border trade and taxation helps fund the political and military operations of the Kachin Independence Organisation, the KIA’s political wing.
Akash Sahu, an independent analyst specialising in Indo-Pacific geopolitics and Southeast Asian affairs, said the regime could easily “push through” on the dam with only limited public support.
But with construction likely to span years, he warned that simmering tensions along the route “may lead to sustained conflict with resistance forces in the region”, while adding that “Naypyidaw seems convinced it will be manageable”.
Whether that confidence is warranted is another matter. Sahu argues that Myanmar’s authorities would be better served taking “the advice and assistance from both China and India to explore sustainable options”.
A history of force
This would not be the first time that a military-controlled government in Myanmar has forced through an unpopular megaproject.
In the 1990s, land was forcibly confiscated and villages were relocated to clear territory for the Yadana and Yetagun gas pipelines. Throughout 2012 and 2013, thousands of acres of farmland were seized from farmers in the Sagaing region to build the Letpadaung Copper Mine – a joint venture between Chinese state-owned Wanbao Mining and UMEHL, a Myanmar military-linked conglomerate – despite sustained and at times violent protest.

“Nothing is ever certain” in Myanmar, Marston said, before adding that the military had a long track record of pushing ahead with development projects regardless of backlash from local communities, especially in ethnic minority states.
Khet Htein Nam – the military-appointed chief of Kachin state who has been actively spearheading the campaign to restart the controversial dam – recently said it would bring “better opportunities for future generations”, according to state media.
Simpson is not so sure. Kachin state already has one of the lowest electrification rates in Myanmar, a function of both the ongoing conflict and the region’s rugged geography. He argues the dam would do little to change that.
“In the unlikely event that the project was ever finished, rural Kachin communities would be unlikely to be able to afford the electricity, even if they were ever connected,” he said.


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Restarting the shelved US$3.6 billion Myitsone Dam project could ultimately come down to Beijing’s ‘risk tolerance’


Restarting the shelved US$3.6 billion Myitsone Dam project could ultimately come down to Beijing’s ‘risk tolerance’.


Myanmar’s China-backed mega dam revival risks Kachin rebel backlash

.css-1c6uqr6{color:inherit;font-weight:inherit;font-size:inherit;font-family:inherit;line-height:inherit;overflow-wrap:break-word;}Restarting the shelved US$3.6 billion Myitsone Dam project could ultimately come down to Beijing’s ‘risk tolerance’

Restarting the shelved US$3.6 billion Myitsone Dam project could ultimately come down to Beijing’s ‘risk tolerance’