Opinion | In Nagorno-Karabakh, drones rain death but won’t bring quick end to war

As both Armenia and Azerbaijan double down on their brutality in the conflict, the Azeris have introduced a dangerous new element

The drones, supplied by Turkey and Israel, have allowed Baku to increase its power-projection capability, removing limits to its aggression

Reading Time:4 minutes

Ethnic Armenian soldiers stand guard in a frontline trench against Azerbaijan's armed forces. Photo: AP

Published: 4:10pm, 23 Oct 2020Updated: 4:35pm, 23 Oct 2020

Each day brings new reports of the horrors of the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. As attempts to broker ceasefires flounder, both sides have doubled down, ratcheting up the brutality. From artillery barrages and missile strikes, the war is now increasingly being fought in the trenches, as waves of volunteers, ex-soldiers and others respond to nationalist appeals from both governments and rush to the front line.

This grinding war of attrition highlights an important fact that should not be overlooked. One feature of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is the widespread Azerbaijani use of drones, which hover above the battlefield and rain down death on command. But their use is also upending conventional military theory, which suggests that they can bring conflicts to a quick, victorious and relatively bloodless end.

This misperception has been fuelled by their success in asymmetrical warfare in a variety of theatres. The United States, for example, has used the most efficient and expensive combat drones to carry out remote assassination missions from Africa to Afghanistan. Militant groups such as Hezbollah and the Houthis have also taken advantage of inexpensive and widely available commercial drones re-engineered as stand-off weapons – flying bombs that can hit targets at a distance without endangering operators.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is different. Azerbaijan has deployed Turkish military drones and Israeli loitering munitions (otherwise known as suicide drones) at medium range – in other words, in the middle of a fight, as conventional air power – inducing fear in the opposing camp, but paradoxically rallying defenders to the cause.

In this regard, drones represent a dangerous new trend – a small state that acquires them in numbers and deploys them as a sort of expanded air force can significantly increase its power-projection capability. This removes some limits to its aggression.

As has happened with cyberweapons, drones have ended the monopoly of rich nations in visiting violence on their foes. For countries such as Azerbaijan, which only has a few fighter jets, inexpensive drones have dangerously altered the perception that their military capabilities are limited, leading to greater aggression.

The promise of warfare without risk increases the chances of conflict escalation. In fact, Azeri drones breaching Armenian airspace could have ignited the first Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)-induced casus belli. Baku’s use of a “drone air force” has also dramatically changed the equation: It has tilted a marginal military power imbalance into a possibly decisive one, putting Yerevan on its heels.

Opinion | In Nagorno-Karabakh, drones rain death but won’t bring quick end to war

As both Armenia and Azerbaijan double down on their brutality in the conflict, the Azeris have introduced a dangerous new element The drones, supplied by Turkey and Israel, have allowed Baku to increase its power-projection capability, removing limits to its aggression

As both Armenia and Azerbaijan double down on their brutality in the conflict, the Azeris have introduced a dangerous new element

The drones, supplied by Turkey and Israel, have allowed Baku to increase its power-projection capability, removing limits to its aggression