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Sharon Seah

Derided by most international observers and the Myanmar diaspora as a sham, the recently concluded three-phase elections in Myanmar have entrenched military rule under a new constitutional government.
For Asean, the outcome throws into sharp relief an increasingly uncomfortable question: should it continue to marginalise the intransigent junta until it complies with the bloc’s Five-Point Consensus (5PC), or find a way to re-engage without betraying the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ own norms?
After a retreat of Asean foreign ministers in late January, Philippine Foreign Secretary Theresa Lazaro, also the Asean chair’s special envoy on Myanmar, clarified that the ministers had not reached a consensus “as of now”.
The chair’s statement, while maintaining that “any meaningful political progress can only take place in an environment of peace, security and inclusivity, supported by the cessation of violence and inclusive dialogue”, masks strategic divergences within the bloc, because exactly how to achieve “meaningful political progress” remains the key unanswered question.

One camp is prepared to give some weight to the election outcome, however flawed, believing it is the start of a political transition, now framed as a generic transition rather than a “transition to democracy” – Asean’s lingo for Myanmar back in the 1990s. For these members, Myanmar could be welcomed back once there is a semblance of a stable government, however unrepresentative, allowing a return to “business as usual” with the country’s leaders rejoining Asean meetings.
A second camp worries that unconditional acceptance would send the wrong message: that state-led atrocities committed against civilians can be swept under the carpet if the right institutional facade is in place. This position is grounded in concerns about human rights, accountability and legitimacy.
A third “middle ground” group supports Asean’s collective non-recognition of the military junta while maintaining low-key bilateral engagement, allowing room for ambiguity and quiet diplomacy with Naypyidaw.
Diplomatic accreditation that was halted after the coup in 2021 has resumed. Brunei, for instance, has appointed a new ambassador and Cambodia recently celebrated the 70th anniversary of its diplomatic ties with Myanmar. Meanwhile, expressing support for the 5PC has not stopped Vietnam from pursuing further cooperation with the junta. Vietnam and Cambodia were the only Asean members to send election observers to Myanmar.
These internal fault lines explain why consensus on Myanmar remains elusive, even as some Asean members have re-engaged through diplomacy, trade, energy and even military cooperation.

Asean will show collective support of the Philippine chair’s position of maintaining non-recognition while leaving the door open for future adjustment. Lazaro has hinted at “certain permutations”, including new proposals to facilitate humanitarian aid. Asked what might change Asean’s stance, she replied that ending the violence would be “the most basic thing that Asean will look at”.
Any sudden convergence of views, whether towards deeper engagement or a harder line, will depend not only on the junta’s willingness to cooperate but also on how creatively Asean chooses to engage other stakeholders.
Given the current situation, Asean needs to revisit how it uses its 5PC. Rather than discard it as obsolete, the bloc can sharpen it into a transactional offer: an end to violence against civilians and political dialogue with non-military stakeholders in exchange for a gradual return to the Asean table.
Such an approach would treat the military as part of both the problem and the solution, recognising its role in any realistic settlement. It also acknowledges an uncomfortable reality: while Asean may loathe the junta’s actions, prolonged non-engagement hurts ordinary Myanmar citizens most.

Singapore’s language on the issue post-2021 shows what constitutes a workable minimum standard. It has consistently argued that “meaningful political progress in Myanmar requires a cessation of hostilities, inclusive dialogue, and participation by all stakeholders”, indicating that the recent elections did not meet these conditions. By emphasising where the elections fell short – on fair conduct and inclusivity – Asean can sidestep technical debates on legal recognition that might constrain its future responses to other elections in the region.
The Myanmar impasse feeds into a broader critique of Asean’s consensus-based decision-making. The bloc’s inability to respond “quickly, firmly and decisively” to fast-moving crises is increasingly seen as a structural weakness in a volatile external environment. Yet moving away from consensus would be politically fraught and could damage Asean unity. A more realistic near-term adjustment would be to use informal coalitions, flexible geometry and clearer thresholds under the 5PC for when Myanmar’s representation at Asean meetings can be upgraded or downgraded.
India’s measured reaction to the elections – described by one expert analysis as “an exercise in managed legitimacy” – reflects its strategic priority on border stability and the preservation of connectivity projects linking northeastern India to Southeast Asia. While the elections may be distasteful, New Delhi has neither condemned nor endorsed the results.


This contrasts with Beijing’s endorsement of a “steady and orderly” election that reflects “the choice of the people”, which is viewed by some as a diplomatic setback for Asean’s position of non-recognition. China’s public messaging on Myanmar reflects the reality that while it may pay lip service to Asean centrality, this does not prevent its pursuit of national interests, including maintaining border security, protecting commercial interests and preserving strategic access to the Indian Ocean. Far from making Beijing look bad, this divergence on recognition has reinforced regional perceptions of China’s considerable leverage over Myanmar.
By maintaining a position of non-recognition for now, Asean has chosen adherence to its commitment to democracy, rule of law, good governance and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, all of which are enshrined in the Asean Charter, even if practical tools to defend these norms remain limited. The real test ahead is whether Asean can translate its principled non-recognition into a more politically astute strategy of conditional engagement that alleviates civilian suffering without rewarding the Myanmar junta’s impunity. To do this requires sustained political will.
Sharon Seah is a Senior Fellow with ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. This article was first published by the institute’s commentary website fulcrum.sg.


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This Week in Asia

Opinion

Asia Opinion

Asean should not discard the Five-Point Consensus, but translate it into a politically astute strategy of conditional engagement


Asean should not discard the Five-Point Consensus, but translate it into a politically astute strategy of conditional engagement.


Myanmar

Diplomacy

The Philippines

Human rights

War and conflict

Min Aung Hlaing

China

Vietnam

Singapore

Brunei Darussalam

India

Cambodia

Maria Theresa Lazaro

ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute

Expresses the views, ideas and conclusions of the author. (Eg. Enough of Crazy Rich Asians, think of crazy poor Hongkongers.)


Column

Asian Angle

.css-1c6uqr6{color:inherit;font-weight:inherit;font-size:inherit;font-family:inherit;line-height:inherit;overflow-wrap:break-word;}Asean should not discard the Five-Point Consensus, but translate it into a politically astute strategy of conditional engagement

Asean should not discard the Five-Point Consensus, but translate it into a politically astute strategy of conditional engagement