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Daljit Singh

This year marks the 50th anniversary of the end of “America’s war” in Vietnam from 1965 to 1975. The US entered the war in the closing years of an era when it was prepared to fight communist expansion wherever it occurred, a policy initially signalled by the Truman Doctrine.
The Vietnam war was a catastrophe in terms of its huge human toll and economic cost, and many Americans viewed it as a tragic folly.
However, it proved to be a protective shield against the spread of communism in Southeast Asia. Without direct US military intervention in Vietnam in 1965, the Southeast Asia that we know today may not have existed.
Despite the US’ setbacks in Vietnam, it has remained a vital component of the Asia-Pacific power balance. However, now the policies of Donald Trump’s administration – to reshape the global trade order and US security posture – have generated uncertainties about the adjustments to come, including the roles of its allies and partners.
The domino theory, fashionable in US policy circles in the 1950s and early 1960s in its extreme form, assumed that if Vietnam fell to the communists, the rest of Southeast Asia would follow suit. In the US, the theory had its leftist and progressive critics and establishment figures, who thought it was too simplistic.

Non-communist Southeast Asian governments were also deeply concerned about the potential spread of communism from Vietnam.
The American military intervention in March 1965 removed the danger of an imminent communist victory in South Vietnam. It also strengthened the confidence of the army generals in Indonesia who, after the abortive pro-communist coup of September 1965, set up an anti-communist government in Jakarta and moved to destroy the Communist Party of Indonesia.
The threat of communism and uncertainties about the outcome of the Vietnam war were among the factors that led to the formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in 1967.
In 1975, when South Vietnam fell to the communists, there was again alarm that the domino theory might materialise because after the US’ withdrawal, there was no countervailing power to balance China and Vietnam’s million-strong battle-hardened army.
Laos and Cambodia did fall quickly, but other countries did not because the US’ involvement in the war bought time for changes to take place in the region’s international relations, to non-communist Southeast Asia’s benefit.
Sino-Soviet relations had deteriorated sharply, while failures in Vietnam influenced then-US president Nixon’s opening to China, leading to US-China detente.
Within a few years, Sino-Soviet rivalry spread to Southeast Asia with Vietnam as a Soviet partner.
Geopolitical reshuffle
To thwart the perceived Soviet threat to its interests in the region, China started cultivating Southeast Asian governments and abandoning support for communist insurgencies. Thus, remarkably, China became a balancer against Soviet-Vietnam ambitions in the region, in political partnership with the US.
Despite some initial scepticism after its ignominious withdrawal from Vietnam, the US remained an indispensable player in the Asia-Pacific security arena, maintaining its key alliances and deterrent power, except for its withdrawal from bases in the Philippines in 1991-92, at Manila’s request.


Most non-communist countries in this region came to recognise the US’ importance, as regional dynamics changed after the collapse of the Soviet Union and China ceased to be strategically aligned with the US. Without the US, no combination of Asian countries could balance China.
The Vietnam experience produced the Nixon Doctrine, according to which the US would not again fight a land war with ground troops in the Asia-Pacific. It would instead pursue a largely maritime strategy based on naval and air power – reflecting a more judicious use of power and avoiding involvement in foreign wars that did not serve vital US interests.
This came to be dubbed as “conservative realism”, which has remained the basic template for the US’ policy vis-a-vis the Asia-Pacific. While the US has been committed to South Korea’s defence, for instance, much of the burden of fighting a land war would be Seoul’s responsibility.
In recent years, the challenge from a China that is now far more powerful has led to the rise of quadrilateral and trilateral arrangements to strengthen extended deterrence.

Anxiety among the US’ Asian allies and friends about the durability of its security presence is not new. There has always been an undercurrent of it because the US is a distant power and has had a long history of isolationism.
The anxiety becomes more acute at certain times, such as after the US’ withdrawal from Vietnam and after the Cold War, when unease surfaced about whether the US would continue to deploy significant forces in the Western Pacific.
Changes in the strategic balance in the Western Pacific, including the China-Russia and the North Korea-Russia alignments, and in domestic US politics, have been propelling new adjustments to the US’ strategic posture in this region.
The growth of China’s military power is making it even more challenging for Washington to maintain deterrence without much stronger allied support. Hence, the US is increasing pressure on Asian allies to spend much more on defence.
Though the US might not withdraw substantially from the Asia-Pacific, uncertainties have arisen about what adjustments are required from its allies and partners.
This uncertainty is compounded by Trump’s tariff war. The president has a world view and a vision of what America’s role in the world should be, which is often obscured by his capriciousness and grandstanding. A landmark policy statement akin to the Truman or Nixon Doctrine is needed.
Can there be a credible Trump Doctrine, given the internal contradictions in his administration and Trump’s inconsistencies and unpredictability?
Daljit Singh is Visiting Senior Fellow at the Regional Strategic & Political Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. This article was first published on the institute’s commentary website fulcrum.sg.


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Huey helicopters carrying US troops land in Vietnam in August 1965. Photo: AP

Vietnamese troop march during a parade in Ho Chi Minh city on April 30 to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the fall of Saigon. Photo: Reuters

Huey helicopters carrying US troops land near Plei Ho Drong, Vietnam, in August 1965. Photo: AP

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US President Donald Trump’s son Eric (right) at the groundbreaking ceremony for a new Trump-branded golf resort in Vietnam. Photo: AFP

Trump Tower in New York. The Trump Organisation plans to build a similar edifice in Vietnam’s Ho Chi Minh City. Photo: AP

Eric Trump speaks at the groundbreaking ceremony for the Trump International Hung Yen golf project in Vietnam on May 21. Photo: VNA via AP

(From left) To Lam, general secretary of Vietnam’s Communist Party, and US President Donald Trump. Photos: AFP

An aerial view of historic low-rise properties in front of high-rise commercial buildings in Ho Chi Minh City. Photo: AFP

Eric Trump and his wife Lara Trump (second from left) take a selfie with Dang Thanh Tam (second from right) as they attend the groundbreaking ceremony for the Hung Yen golf course project. Photo: AFP

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Vietnamese veterans take part in a parade on Wednesday during the 50th anniversary celebrations of the end of the Vietnam war. Photo: AP

Vietnam war veteran Chuck Searcy has spent the last three decades running aid programmes in the country. Photo: Huw Watkin

Former Associated Press journalist Carl Robinson. Photo: Huw Watkin 

Ted Engelmann, a former US Air Force forward air controller who directed air strikes for the US and South Vietnamese. Photo: Huw Watkin

Revellers watch a parade marking the 50th anniversary of reunification in Ho Chi Minh City on Wednesday. Photo: Kyodo

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US Secretary of State Marco Rubio will embark on a high-profile tour of Asia next week. Photo: AFP

US President Donald Trump has said he is “not thinking about the pause” in tariffs. Photo: TNS

A woman parks a motorbike in front of a “Made in Vietnam” store at a street in Hanoi on Thursday. The US will impose a 20 per cent tariff on Vietnamese exports to America. Photo: EPA

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The Vietnam war ended 50 years ago. Its complex legacy offers context for Donald Trump’s global trade and security shake-up


The Vietnam war ended 50 years ago. Its complex legacy offers context for Donald Trump’s global trade and security shake-up.


Vietnam

Donald Trump

Asean

China

Cambodia

Laos

South Korea

War and conflict

History

Defence

China-Asean relations

US-China relations

Donald Trump’s China policy

Indonesia

Sweden

United States

ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute

Expresses the views, ideas and conclusions of the author. (Eg. Enough of Crazy Rich Asians, think of crazy poor Hongkongers.)


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Asian Angle

.css-1c6uqr6{color:inherit;font-weight:inherit;font-size:inherit;font-family:inherit;line-height:inherit;overflow-wrap:break-word;}The Vietnam war ended 50 years ago. Its complex legacy offers context for Donald Trump’s global trade and security shake-up

The Vietnam war ended 50 years ago. Its complex legacy offers context for Donald Trump’s global trade and security shake-up