Why Europe must accept blame for erosion of the global order

At the opening of the Munich Security Conference this year, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz warned that the rules-based international order is eroding before our eyes. His remarks echoed the conference’s annual report, which painted a picture of fragmentation and disorder. His remarks also echoed a growing anxiety across Europe: that the system built after 1945 is eroding under the weight of geopolitical rivalry, economic coercion and military confrontation. However, to many observers, Europe’s lament rings hollow. If the international order is weakening, it is not simply because of revisionist powers challenging the West. It is also because Western states – Europe included – have treated international rules as flexible instruments rather than binding commitments. If Europe genuinely seeks to restore global credibility to international law, it must first confront its own record of selective adherence. The cornerstone of the post-World War II legal system is the prohibition on the use of force under the UN Charter, except in self-defence or with Security Council authorisation. However, at key moments Europe has supported military interventions that stretched or bypassed this framework. The 1999 Nato intervention in Kosovo proceeded without UN Security Council authorisation, justified instead as a humanitarian necessity. The 2003 invasion of Iraq, while opposed by some European governments, nonetheless saw several European states join a “coalition of the willing” despite contested legal grounds. In 2011, France and the United Kingdom took the lead in Libya, where a civilian protection mandate evolved into de facto regime change. Each case was defended as exceptional. Taken together, however, they contributed to a pattern: rules apply, but not always; sovereignty matters, but not uniformly. To some outside the transatlantic alliance, this signalled that international law could be reinterpreted when strategic imperatives demanded it. Such precedents have weakened the normative force of the very system Europe now seeks to defend. The erosion of order is not limited to military affairs. The global trading system, institutionalised through the World Trade Organization, was designed to provide predictability, non-discrimination and binding dispute settlement. Yet in recent years, successive US administrations have imposed unilateral tariffs, export controls and extraterritorial sanctions that stretch the boundaries of multilateral trade rules. European leaders often express concern, and the European Union has adopted measures such as a “blocking statute” to shield its companies from US secondary sanctions. In practice, however, most European firms comply with Washington’s restrictions rather than risk losing access to the US financial system. This pattern – rhetorical resistance followed by practical accommodation – reinforces a perception among some in the Global South that economic sovereignty is conditional and that global trade rules yield to geopolitical power. Europe might not design these coercive measures, but by failing to mount sustained institutional resistance, it legitimises a system where financial dominance substitutes for multilateral consensus. The transatlantic alliance has increasingly framed global politics as a systemic contest between democracy and authoritarianism, particularly in relation to China. Concerns about governance and human rights are legitimate and should not be dismissed. However, when normative language is closely intertwined with export bans, technology restrictions and military balancing, it risks being perceived as instrumental rather than universal. For many developing countries, the problem is not that values are defended – it is that they appear to be selectively invoked. Human rights violations by adversaries are highlighted; those by partners often receive muted responses. Over time, this erodes the credibility of universal norms and fuels the narrative that the “rules-based order” is synonymous with Western strategic alignment. If international principles are seen as geopolitical tools, their persuasive power diminishes. Within Europe, debate persists over how closely to align with Washington. French President Emmanuel Macron has repeatedly called for “strategic autonomy”, arguing that Europe must become an independent pole in an increasingly multipolar world. Others, including North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Secretary General Mark Rutte, emphasise the primacy of transatlantic unity. This internal tension reflects a deeper question: can Europe act as a stabilising force in global governance while remaining structurally dependent on US security guarantees and financial infrastructure? So long as Europe functions primarily as a junior partner and lends multilateral legitimacy to policies shaped in Washington, its status as a neutral guardian of international rules will struggle to gain traction beyond the West. The international order is under strain, but its fragility is not solely the result of external challengers. It is also the cumulative outcome of decisions taken in Western capitals – decisions that normalised intervention without authorisation, economic coercion without multilateral approval and selective invocation of universal principles. If Europe wishes to restore credibility to the global system, three shifts are essential. First, there must be consistency in upholding the UN Charter, including when alliance politics makes restraint inconvenient. Second, there must be genuine defence of multilateral trade mechanisms, moving beyond symbolic protest towards structural solutions that reduce vulnerability to unilateral extraterritorial measures. Third, there must be universal application of norms so principles regain legitimacy as global standards rather than bloc-based instruments. A mature partnership with the United States need not mean automatic alignment. On the contrary, true strategic confidence would allow Europe to disagree openly when core rules are at stake. If European leaders believe the “rules-based international order” is worth saving, they must ensure Europe is not seen as enabling its erosion. The credibility of global governance depends on confronting challengers as well as exercising restraint among allies.

Why Europe must accept blame for erosion of the global order

.css-1c6uqr6{color:inherit;font-weight:inherit;font-size:inherit;font-family:inherit;line-height:inherit;overflow-wrap:break-word;}If Europe genuinely seeks to restore credibility to international law, it must first confront its own record of selective adherence

If Europe genuinely seeks to restore credibility to international law, it must first confront its own record of selective adherence