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Rob York

The US decision to raid Venezuela, detain its President Nicolas Maduro and bring him to the United States, ostensibly on drug trafficking charges, will have serious downstream effects, but of what variety?
US President Donald Trump has already sent ominous warnings to other Latin American countries whose leaders oppose all or parts of his agenda – from Colombia to Cuba to Mexico – and threatened Maduro’s successor with similar, or worse, treatment if she does not cooperate. Does this suggest future extraction missions in Venezuela or the rest of Latin America?
It has certainly led to questions of whether Venezuela’s interim president Delcy Rodriguez was left in power because the US perceived her as more pliant than Maduro, because of this administration’s stated aversion to regime change or whether it was over a grudge against opposition leader Maria Corina Machado for accepting the Nobel Peace Prize that Trump believes should be his.
More information will surely come out. Some initial reporting on Trump’s view of Machado – and Rodriguez’s declarations that Venezuela will “never again be anyone’s colony” – suggest the last reason is closer to the truth.
It also raises questions as to whether the US will assume that such missions can be duplicated in other country conditions. On the one hand, the US certainly does enjoy military superiority over the other Latin American countries mentioned, and some reports suggest the Chinese-made radar that Caracas depended on failed them at the most crucial of moments.
On the other hand, the element of surprise is now gone. If such a risky undertaking was to go badly, it would puncture the aura that this administration hopes will keep neighbouring countries in line. Hence, more such missions in Latin America appear unlikely for now.


The move has also triggered a new wave of trepidation about a potential US seizing of Greenland. Taking Greenland, however, would require not extraction but occupation for the long term, as well as potentially bringing the US into conflict with fellow Nato members. That makes it unlikely for now.
There is talk of what US rivals will learn from this mission, as well. While both China and Russia officially denounced Maduro’s seizure, there has been some chatter in the corners of the Chinese and Russian internet about lessons that could be learned in dispatching regional rivals.
In Russia’s case, this means largely deploring the missed opportunity to do something similar in Ukraine in 2022, which says a good deal about their capacity – or lack thereof – to carry out high-profile extraction missions in the future.
The Chinese case is more interesting and more complex. Beijing’s ever-expanding military modernisation includes enhancing the ability of its special forces to act quickly and decisively, especially against Taiwan. The capability and desirability of similar actions against Taipei’s leadership have been a focal point for Chinese online commentators so far.
Would a relatively risk-averse Beijing attempt such a manoeuvre? I am of the opinion that Beijing will not use military force to reunify with Taiwan ahead of the “Davidson window” – named for the former US Navy admiral Philip Davidson, who said in 2021 that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would seek to carry out such an operation by the end of 2027.




Even regarding that date, however, the goal of the PLA is to acquire the capability to do so. That does not necessarily mean there is a commitment to follow through. The reason for this view is Beijing’s relatively risk-averse nature, having long refrained from committing troops to resolving a conflict abroad – and a Taiwan contingency is inherently risky no matter the preparations. Any extraction mission targeting Taiwan’s leader William Lai Ching-te would be as well.
Furthermore, the PLA would not launch an attack unless it becomes convinced it cannot accomplish its goals for Taiwan politically. With the Kuomintang party holding a majority in the Legislative Yuan and some polls placing Lai’s approval ratings under 30 per cent, Beijing should not feel disheartened in this regard. Therefore, it appears unlikely it would attempt a similar extraction mission, which might add support to Lai’s cause, regardless of whether it succeeds.
Among the rationales discussed for the US mission against Maduro is the desire for hemispheric security – an especially hot topic since the latest US National Security Strategy, released in November, suggested the US will prioritise its interests in North and South America above all others. This raid on Venezuela, which is one of China’s closest partners in Latin America, seems to be a warning shot against China and a signal that the US is determined to dominate the western hemisphere.




We can infer that this is a higher priority than Beijing’s sphere of influence, but not that the US is completely withdrawing from Asia. The recent US arms sales to Taiwan suggest an ongoing commitment, and even a security strategy focused closer to home still talked of deterring conflict in the Taiwan Strait by maintaining “military overmatch”.
Whatever else flows from the events of January 3, it is in the interests of Beijing to maintain an active presence in Latin America. The more opponents of the US that Beijing can prop up there, the harder it will be for Washington to focus on rivalries farther afield. By telegraphing its priorities and the lengths the US is willing to pursue to uphold them, the Trump administration might have exacerbated conflicts closer to home rather than solving them.


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Why US move against Maduro unlikely to drive China from Latin America

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One of the helicopters believed to be carrying Venezuela’s Maduro and his wife arrives in New York City on Saturday. Photo: Reuters

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Venezuela’s interim President Delcy Rodriguez. Photo: AFP

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US President Donald Trump (right) speaks as US Secretary of State Marco Rubio looks on during a press conference in Palm Beach, Florida, after he ordered strikes on Venezuela, on January 3. Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and his wife were also captured by US special forces during the bombing raid. Photo: Reuters

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By signalling how far it will go to defend its interests in Venezuela, the US might have intensified conflicts closer to home rather than resolving them


By signalling how far it will go to defend its interests in Venezuela, the US might have intensified conflicts closer to home rather than resolving them.


Venezuela

Taiwan

Ukraine

Russia

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA)

China-Latin America relations

Greenland

China

United States

Nicolas Maduro

William Lai Ching-te

Expresses the views, ideas and conclusions of the author. (Eg. Enough of Crazy Rich Asians, think of crazy poor Hongkongers.)


Why US move against Maduro unlikely to drive China from Latin America

.css-1c6uqr6{color:inherit;font-weight:inherit;font-size:inherit;font-family:inherit;line-height:inherit;overflow-wrap:break-word;}By signalling how far it will go to defend its interests in Venezuela, the US might have intensified conflicts closer to home rather than resolving them

By signalling how far it will go to defend its interests in Venezuela, the US might have intensified conflicts closer to home rather than resolving them