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Thomas Graham

Zongyuan Zoe Liu

The sight of Chinese President Xi Jinping visiting the Kremlin for Russia’s World War II Victory Day parade has rekindled the idea that China might finally pressure Russian President Vladimir Putin to end the war in Ukraine. But it has been more than three years since Russia invaded its neighbour, and little suggests that China is willing to support good-faith peace negotiations.
China has continued to back Russia diplomatically, economically and militarily. The Chinese government avoids referring to Putin’s aggression as an “invasion”, and even though it has not formally recognised Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian territory, it has repeatedly abstained from United Nations votes condemning Putin’s war.
Publicly, China echoes Russia’s narrative, blaming Nato and the West for the conflict. Chinese officials and state media accuse the United States of being “the real provocateur of the Ukrainian crisis” and have warned it against further confrontation.
For his part, Xi has shown no signs of reconsidering the Sino-Russian “comprehensive strategic partnership for the new era”. Shortly after Donald Trump’s inauguration this year, Xi and Putin pledged that their countries would “deepen strategic coordination, firmly support each other, and defend their legitimate interests”.
Economically, China has extended Russia a lifeline as Western sanctions have intensified. Sino-Russian bilateral trade soared from US$147 billion in 2021 to a record US$245 billion in 2024. Chinese consumer products, notably automobiles and smartphones, rapidly poured in as Western brands withdrew.
Similarly, China is poised to import more energy from Russia in 2025 (likely at heavily discounted prices), which will help the Kremlin finance its war effort. Since 2023, Russia has become China’s top crude oil supplier. Despite the risk of penalties, small regional Chinese banks have continued processing payments for sanctioned Russian companies. While China has not openly provided direct lethal aid, it has exported to Russia a steady stream of dual-use items, notably microchips essential for precision-guided weaponry.
Despite its close ties with Russia, China has tried to present itself as a peacemaker. In February 2023, it released a peace framework; in May 2024, it partnered with Brazil on a six-point initiative to end the war. A Chinese special envoy has since visited several countries, including Russia and Ukraine, to promote the proposal. But China is less interested in ending the war than in winning goodwill across the Global South and refurbishing its image in Europe.




Why should it be otherwise? China benefits strategically as long as the war stays within Ukraine, the nuclear risk remains low and its “unlimited partner”, Russia, does not lose. The conflict diverts US attention from the Indo-Pacific, giving China more room to advance its interests. It has also deepened Russia’s political and economic dependence on China, improving China’s access to Russian resources via routes beyond the US Navy’s reach.
Meanwhile, Chinese firms in strategic sectors, such as drone-makers DJI, EHang and Autel, have cashed in by selling products to both sides. In early 2023, direct drone shipments to Ukraine exceeded US$200,000, while shipments to Russia topped US$14.5 million. Despite sanctions, DJI’s drones continued reaching Russian forces through smaller distributors in China, the Middle East and Europe.
Even if China was truly open to facilitating peace talks, Ukraine would remain rightly sceptical of its neutrality. Xi has ignored Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s repeated requests to meet and did not speak with him until April 2023 – over a year after Russia’s invasion. China showed limited interest in Ukraine’s 10-point peace formula, released in November 2022, and it skipped a global summit (attended by 92 countries) on the issue in June 2024. Instead, China released its joint peace proposal with Brazil.


The US has little leverage to change China’s position. More tariffs or sanctions could backfire, and Trump’s tariffs have alienated much of the world, including China. Instead of bending, China may align even more closely with Russia to thwart America’s negotiations and strengthen its renminbi-based financial system, undermining US sanctions and economic clout.
Still, Trump could appeal to Xi’s desire for global stature. By offering China a major role in Ukraine’s reconstruction, the US would grant China’s leadership the prestige it craves. Moreover, China would become an invested stakeholder in Ukraine’s security, providing a more sustainable deterrent against future Russian aggression.
Ukraine has been part of Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative since 2017. Before Russia’s invasion, China had nearly US$3 billion in Belt and Road Initiative-related contracts in Ukraine and had leased up to 10 per cent of Ukraine’s farmland. Those investments were likely wiped out, but China did not protest; its economic loss was inconsequential compared to its strategic gains from the war.
A lasting peace could tempt China to return. Ukraine’s industrial, energy, infrastructure and agriculture sectors offer new markets for Chinese firms squeezed by overcapacity at home and rising tariffs abroad. Giving China a stake in Ukraine’s reconstruction could transform it from a passive pro-Russia bystander into an active participant in peacemaking.
The reconstruction bill will be too large for the West to foot on its own. A year ago, the World Bank estimated the costs at US$486 billion (about 2.6 per cent of China’s gross domestic product in 2024) over the next decade, and this price tag has only risen since then. The West will have no choice but to seek assistance, including from the Gulf states and China.
But the first task is to encourage China’s interest in engagement. Perhaps the only way to do that is to convince China’s leaders that the US will not accept Ukraine’s capitulation and will continue to support it until a just settlement is reached.


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Ukraine war

How to persuade China to truly work for peace in Ukraine

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping attend the Victory Day military parade on Red Square in Moscow on May 9. Photo: Pool/AFP

Yalta 2.0? Why Trump, Xi and Putin didn’t meet to carve up the world

Illustration: Lau Ka-kuen

On Thursday, China’s President Xi Jinping and Russian leader Vladimir Putin pledged to counter what they described as Washington’s attempt at “dual containment” of their countries. Photo: AP

How China became central to Russia’s Victory Day parade

Russian President Vladimir Putin at the military parade on Victory Day, which marks the 78th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany in World War Two, in Red Square in central Moscow, Russia, on May 9, 2023. Photo: Sputnik/ Pool via Reuters

Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky with US President Donald Trump on the sidelines of Pope Francis’ funeral at St Peter’s Basilica at the Vatican on April 26. Photo: AFP/Official Telegram channel of the Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine Andriy Yermak

Russia’s Putin vows victory in Ukraine as Trump pushes for 30-day ceasefire

Russian servicemen marching in the Victory Day military parade in Moscow’s Red Square. Photo: RIA Novosti via EPA-EFE EFE

China’s President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin watch the parade. Photo: RIA Novosti via AP

Chinese troops march on Red Square. Photo: RIA Novosti via Reuters

Opinion

World Opinion

China has gained strategically from Russia’s war. It has to be convinced that actively rebuilding Ukraine would bring even greater benefits


China has gained strategically from Russia’s war. It has to be convinced that actively rebuilding Ukraine would bring even greater benefits.


Vladimir Putin

Russia

Ukraine

Nato

China-Russia relations

Donald Trump

War and conflict

China

United States

Xi Jinping

World Bank Group

Ehang

Expresses the views, ideas and conclusions of the author. (Eg. Enough of Crazy Rich Asians, think of crazy poor Hongkongers.)


How to persuade China to truly work for peace in Ukraine

.css-1c6uqr6{color:inherit;font-weight:inherit;font-size:inherit;font-family:inherit;line-height:inherit;overflow-wrap:break-word;}China has gained strategically from Russia’s war. It has to be convinced that actively rebuilding Ukraine would bring even greater benefits

China has gained strategically from Russia’s war. It has to be convinced that actively rebuilding Ukraine would bring even greater benefits