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China economy
OpinionChina Opinion
Opinion
Alejandro Reyes

China’s economic problems have been diagnosed. Will policymakers act?

What is missing is the willingness to redirect resources away from growth engines of the past and directly support Chinese households

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Vehicles being loaded onto a ship at Yantai Port in east China’s Shandong province on July 15. China’s gross domestic product grew 4.3 per cent in the second quarter, lagging the government’s growth target of 4.5 to 5 per cent for the year. Photo: Xinhua
Alejandro Reyes is an adjunct professor in the Department of Politics and Public Administration and senior fellow at the Centre on Contemporary China and the World at The University of Hong Kong.
For most of this year, the dominant framing of China’s economy has been “K-shaped”: strong technology and export sectors pulling away from a weaker domestic base. In July, at an online seminar hosted by Renmin University’s China Macroeconomy Forum, Tsinghua University economist Li Daokui said that framing was itself the problem.

China’s real issue, he argued, was not divergence between a rising line and a falling one but a whole economy that had been running cold for three years. The strong sectors everyone kept pointing to have been too small to pull up the rest.

Li previously served on the People’s Bank of China’s Monetary Policy Committee and directs Tsinghua’s Academic Centre for Chinese Economic Practice and Thinking. These credentials place him inside the policy establishment, not at its margins.

Using the International Labour Organization’s broader definition of unemployment, which counts discouraged workers the official statistic excludes, Li put China’s real unemployment rate at 10.2 per cent, with roughly 24 million people out of work long enough to count as chronically underemployed.

He noted that fixed-asset investment had fallen 4.1 per cent in the first five months of the year, a contraction that had a precedent only twice in modern China’s statistical history: 1961, during the famine that followed the Great Leap Forward, and 1967, at the height of the Cultural Revolution. Local governments, he said, had shifted from being the economy’s primary engine to a blockage within it, extracting resources from firms through tax collection and arrears rather than investing productively.

02:16
Chinese premier sets 2026 GDP growth target at 4.5-5%
Li’s diagnosis echoed something a more senior figure has said for years. Liu Shijin, a former vice-minister at the Development Research Centre, warned as far back as the 2022 Caixin Summit that China’s weak growth “cannot continue”. More than three years on, at a June 27 session of the Renmin forum series, his diagnosis had sharpened.
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