On Taiwan, Trump reimagines strategic ambiguity to suit his own ends

Beijing is probably sighing with relief following US President Donald Trump’s postponement of his visit to China for “a month or so”. Initially, Trump had tried to threaten China for not joining a proposed naval escort campaign in the Strait of Hormuz, but quickly changed his tone after recognising the absurdity of such a demand. Not even the United States’ closest allies are willing to lend a hand. However, Beijing is even more frustrated with Washington’s lack of clarity and Trump’s hazy agenda for what he wants to accomplish on his coming visit. This month’s meeting in Paris, France, between Vice-Premier He Lifeng and US Treasury Secretary Bessent to discuss the detailed agenda apparently yielded little of substance. Few seem to understand why Trump is unwilling to reveal his hand before his much hyped visit: in fact, his operational style has changed – from traditional strategic ambiguity into one that may perhaps be best understood as “compound strategic ambiguity”. The fundamental principle of traditional strategic ambiguity is to foster uncertainty – in this case, to deter Taiwan’s reunification by force. During his first term, Trump primarily employed traditional strategic ambiguity, using the unspoken uncertainty of how the US would react to a military unification of Taiwan. Traditional strategic ambiguity has long been a US tool for seeking stability in the Taiwan Strait. However, such a strategy has a singular objective and lacks the operational space to use Taiwan as a bargaining chip. Thus, it fails to meet the demands of Trump’s preference for making deals. He once publicly suggested that the one-China policy was meaningless to the US unless it could be used as a bargaining chip for something else. To compensate for the shortcomings of traditional strategic ambiguity, his team of modern-day West Coast Straussians have proposed a strategy of compound strategic ambiguity, the gist of which was reflected in the US’ 2025 National Security Strategy. This shift has provided Trump with a new operational approach to summit diplomacy with Beijing, as it frees up room for bargaining for a new deal. The crux of this approach is not to reveal Washington’s hand before negotiations, thereby deliberately creating contradictory rhetoric, mixed signals and confused policy shifts, which fit into Trump’s supposed “art of the deal”. The operational characteristics of compound strategic ambiguity are mainly manifested in sending mixed signals to Taiwan through strong support, such as unprecedented arms sales, with transactional demands such as pressuring the island to spend more on its own defence. It also involves sending signals to Beijing by changing the traditional expression that the US “opposes” to “does not support” any action that unilaterally changes the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. This indicates that Trump’s strategic ambiguity is a passive response to China’s actions rather than serving the purpose of containment. More importantly, Trump has arguably abandoned the US’ “Six Assurances” to Taiwan – particularly that Washington will never consult Beijing regarding arms sales to Taiwan – when he publicly admitted to discussing arms sales during his recent call with President Xi Jinping. The message he is trying to convey is that US policy towards Taiwan is no longer part of a grand strategy to defeat China but rather a way to link it with a deal with Beijing while maintaining stability in the Taiwan Strait. Trump’s assertion that there will be no conflict in the Taiwan Strait during his term reflects his eagerness to reach a deal. For him, reaching this deal within his term is sufficient. A military conflict in the Taiwan Strait would disrupt all his radical agenda for great power diplomacy. Moreover, Trump has blurred the lines between allies and competitors, especially by sending the message that the trade war is not solely aimed at Beijing. This approach has allowed him to use whatever means, including Taiwan, to achieve trade or financial gains. Finally, Trump’s compound strategic ambiguity is based on diplomacy without the pretence of ideology. The 2025 National Security Strategy redefines the relationship between the US and its allies and partners as one based on strategic conditionality. It views traditional US support for allies as conditional, aligning with Trump’s use of the Taiwan Strait as a bargaining chip. China may be finding it difficult to understand Trump’s new approach in his second term, given the significant differences in US and Chinese operational methods and psychological characteristics of summit diplomacy. China’s operational characteristics are more traditional and require confirmation of both sides’ basic demands before negotiations. Trump, on the other hand, has deviated from traditional diplomatic practices, especially when it comes to Taiwan. It’s almost impossible to establish a basic consensus before summits take place. His compound strategic ambiguity puts contradictory signals on top of traditional strategic ambiguity, and thus disrupts the other side’s routine procedural decision-making and strategic resolve. For Trump, the intended objectives of his visit to China can only be achieved by improvisation, as he is confident that he can gain the upper hand that way. Furthermore, the White House’s deliberate disclosure of a US$20 billion arms sale to Taiwan before the summit is a signal that it intends to use the island as a bargaining chip. Trump’s calculation may be that he can walk it back if a long-term deal to stabilise the Taiwan Strait is reached. However, if no deal is reached, he can legitimately prepare the sale already on the table.

On Taiwan, Trump reimagines strategic ambiguity to suit his own ends

.css-1c6uqr6{color:inherit;font-weight:inherit;font-size:inherit;font-family:inherit;line-height:inherit;overflow-wrap:break-word;}By sending mixed signals to both Beijing and Taipei, the Trump administration has turned cross-strait stability into a bargaining chip

By sending mixed signals to both Beijing and Taipei, the Trump administration has turned cross-strait stability into a bargaining chip