China’s diplomatic gains with the US are a political insurance policy

In the aftermath of the recent meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump, many interpretations have emerged. However, one crucial dimension has been overlooked: the way in which Xi’s domestic priorities influence his foreign policy agenda. The de-escalation of trade tensions between China and the United States goes beyond fentanyl, rare earth elements, the chip war and Beijing’s purchase of US soybeans. It constitutes one of the key elements of internal stabilisation for Beijing amid rising global uncertainty. In particular, recent agreements reached with the US act as a political insurance policy in the event of an unfavourable outcome for Russia in its war in Ukraine. In my view, Beijing perceives Moscow as a central pillar of balance in its relations with the West and as a key component in ensuring China’s domestic stability. However, this arrangement cannot last forever. If Russia enters a period of internal turbulence or even an abrupt leadership change, Xi will need to prepare for a potential political and economic shock that could threaten China’s domestic stability. In this sense, recent agreements with the US function as a strategic necessity, a kind of safety belt designed to shield Beijing from potential systemic shocks. This interpretation is not without precedent. The history of the party and “lean-to-one-side” policy towards the Soviet Union is quite instructive in this regard. Moreover, US president Richard Nixon’s visit to Beijing in the winter of 1972, from an internal policy perspective, helped stabilise Communist Party chairman Mao Zedong’s position at a moment when his authority was challenged by party vice-chairman Lin Biao, an avid promoter of Mao’s “little red book” and his designated successor. If, as many believe, Lin opposed diplomatic rapprochement with the US, his mysterious death in a plane crash in 1971 removed a major obstacle. Nixon’s visit, by strengthening the technocratic faction around premier Zhou Enlai, provided much-needed stability within the highest ranks of Chinese leadership. This internal dimension is reinforced by an external narrative. Observing China’s diplomatic behaviour over the years, I note a cyclical pattern – one where Beijing tends to define itself in contrast to Washington and Moscow. As the US began occupying Iraq after its 2003 invasion, China portrayed itself as a power of “peaceful development.” After Russian President Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine, Beijing has continued earlier efforts to frame itself as a “champion of peace.” China acts in contrast to Russia. While Putin’s war has led to self-destructive isolation, Xi seeks to present China as a rational and stabilising actor. Moreover, the Russian war economy may work in the short term, but with weak growth and limited domestic demand, it will become increasingly burdensome. Economic forecasts for this year are not optimistic and the prolonged costs of war could become a destabilising factor. Against this backdrop, Beijing aims to project the image of a pragmatic great power capable of maintaining stability amid global tensions. Even a limited trade or investment agreement with the US can help restore market confidence, attract foreign capital and ensure the continuity of hi-tech exports, all of which directly reinforce the Communist Party’s sense of internal security. Meanwhile, a potential crisis in Russia could disrupt commodity markets and China’s Belt and Road Initiative projects, as well as prompt a more assertive Japanese foreign policy towards Beijing. Instability in Central Asia would in turn affect the stability of China’s western frontier, particularly the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region. In such a scenario, a deal with the US would serve as a security buffer, mitigating the effects of secondary sanctions, trade shocks and capital flight. If China were to lose its strategic buffer represented by Putin’s Russia, which currently ties down Western attention and resources, a deal with Trump would become the economic foundation of China’s modernisation and its plan for developing “new quality productive forces.” This is especially important in the context of Beijing’s preparations for its next five-year plan. From a domestic political perspective, Xi must consolidate his position ahead of the 21st Party Congress which takes place in about two year’s time. His image as the new “helmsman”, a leader capable of maintaining stability amid global chaos and managing crises, must remain unchallenged. Moreover, as stated by Chinese sources, cooperation with the US is expected to include joint action against money laundering. This aligns with Xi’s anti-corruption campaign, further strengthening his authority. Thus, the agreement with the US can be presented internally as proof of Xi’s ability to transform external pressure into developmental momentum and thus safeguard the state’s long-term interests. A limited detente with Washington gives Beijing time to strengthen its technological and financial autonomy, which are key pillars of cultivating self-reliance between 2026 and 2030. In the longer term, it enables Beijing to pursue its own development path without depending on unstable partners. However, there is another key element at play. By managing compromises within the Communist Party and anchoring China’s stability in pragmatic engagement, Xi seeks to surpass the deterministic mindset captured in the opening line of the 14th century epic, The Romance of the Three Kingdoms: “The empire, long divided, must unite; long united, must divide.”

China’s diplomatic gains with the US are a political insurance policy

.css-1c6uqr6{color:inherit;font-weight:inherit;font-size:inherit;font-family:inherit;line-height:inherit;overflow-wrap:break-word;}A limited detente with the US helps China safeguard its domestic policy goals and hedge against potential instability in Russia

A limited detente with the US helps China safeguard its domestic policy goals and hedge against potential instability in Russia