Events since the start of the year have reignited the downward spiral in relations between mainland China and Taiwan that accelerated following Democratic Progressive Party leader William Lai Ching-te’s election
victory last year.
In February, the US State Department
removed mention of opposition to Taiwan independence from its website. In mid-March, Lai
lashed out against Beijing, calling it a “foreign hostile force”. At the end of the month, during a visit to Japan, United States Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth
emphasised Washington’s commitment to “sustaining robust, ready and credible deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, including across the Taiwan Strait”.
Last week Beijing conducted massive
military drills near Taiwan. All of these developments are continuations of existing trends but are no less serious despite their predictability.
The latest round of People’s Liberation Army exercises around Taiwan illustrates a fundamental disconnect in how Washington and Beijing interpret policy signals. This disconnect stems from different points of policy emphasis and anxieties on both sides of the Pacific.
Beijing fears being boxed out of its political position that both sides of the strait belong to one China and thus responds forcefully to political signalling of strengthened ties between the US and Taiwan. Meanwhile, the US fears that Beijing will use force to resolve the Taiwan issue, thus responding to Beijing’s military signals with political support. This downward spiral must be examined and discussed at high levels to bring stability to the Taiwan Strait.
For Beijing, the issue is a domestic political dispute that must be resolved between the two sides of the strait. The Taiwan issue is perceived as unfinished business from the
Chinese civil war and therefore extremely important to resolve for the Communist Party’s legitimacy. The
primary fear is that Taiwan will change the status quo by declaring de jure independence, prompting the rest of the world to formally recognise such a declaration.
