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C. Uday Bhaskar

In a layered signal to Indo-Pacific nations and America’s domestic audience, the Trump administration last week said the US Indo-Pacific Command would revert to its long-used name, the US Pacific Command. The Honolulu-headquartered command was renamed in 2018 during Donald Trump’s first presidency.
The administrative order by the Department of Defence was justified to honour the legacy of America’s oldest and largest unified combatant command, established in 1947. In the run-up to the 250th anniversary of US independence on July 4, the Trump administration is kindling patriotic fervour as part of the Make America Great Again agenda.
While the name change suggests that the command will return to a more traditional focus on the Western Pacific and a priority of deterring China, Pentagon officials have stressed that any operational impact would be negligible.
The command’s vast area of responsibility remains unchanged. It spans roughly 52 per cent of the Earth’s surface, stretching from the US west coast to the western maritime boundary of India in what was once described as from Hollywood to Bollywood. Also unchanged is the command’s mission, which includes maintaining credible power, protecting US interests throughout the Indo-Pacific and enhancing US alliances and partnerships.
The Taiwan challenge looms large on the Honolulu radar and in a recent US Congress testimony, Admiral Samuel Paparo – who heads the command – highlighted Beijing’s growing threat, particularly risks around Taiwan, and urged continued investment.
The US$122 billion package he requested for the 2026-27 financial year covering new military inventory, related systems and logistic support was described as “the minimum investments required to sustain credible deterrence and prevail in conflict if deterrence fails”.

For Beijing, of greater significance is the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue’s loss of relevance. When foreign ministers from the US, Japan, Australia and India met in New Delhi in May, the weakening of military security cooperation was palpable with an emphasis on enhancing collective maritime domain awareness and surveillance capabilities.
The Quad, which began as a forum in 2004, gained in importance when Japan’s then-prime minister Shinzo Abe mooted the Indo-Pacific concept of the “confluence of the two seas” in New Delhi in August 2007. A major naval exercise was planned for the following month, with the India-US Malabar exercises expanded to include Japan, Australia and Singapore. This led to a Chinese démarche before the five-navy exercise – highlighting Beijing’s sensitivity to coordinated Quad naval activity that led to the group remaining dormant for over a decade.
Still, the introduction of the Indo-Pacific as a maritime and strategic construct allowed India and the Indian Ocean to be brought into what had previously been known as the Asia-Pacific rubric. In 2018, a major strategic punctuation occurred when the US Pacific Command was renamed the US Indo-Pacific Command. In a watershed moment, Washington acknowledged the rising global relevance of the Indian Ocean and of India as the western “bookend” of America’s Indo-Pacific strategy.
Around this time, Washington began to identify China as a pacing challenge. The Quad provided an institutional framework for the revival of political consultation and the structuring of naval cooperation combining the Indian and Pacific oceans into one cohesive theatre of operations. The Quad’s political high point was its 2024 summit, hosted by then-US president Joe Biden at his Delaware home.
But the second Trump administration is not as enthused about the Quad’s potential in managing the China challenge, while US-India relations have become estranged over the past year. India’s reluctance to become a US military ally in containing China and Washington’s disappointment over what it perceived as New Delhi’s limited contribution to the Quad’s security component resulted in an erosion of the grouping’s military relevance.

This offers Beijing a significant strategic reassurance: that India will not become the critical swing state that will tilt the military balance against China. New Delhi has also had to accept that its relationship with Washington has become more transactional and uncertain due to Trump’s petulance and mercurial policy shifts.
The core issue is how well the US, China and India can harness the maritime/naval strand of their grand strategy, along with their political objectives. The US is the leading naval power in the Indo-Pacific and China is determined to match it, while India is a distant third.
China, however, has to consider complex maritime geographical constraints subsumed in the vulnerability of its “Malacca dilemma” – the Strait of Malacca is crucial to China’s crude oil imports and trade flows – whereas India is endowed with a favourable strategic geography but remains hesitant to exploit this advantage.
A change of name for the Honolulu command is a signal that the US will now focus on core Pacific priorities and transactional engagements – without altering the military map. For Beijing, the move is a modest diplomatic perception gain but it also adds to anxieties over Taiwan; for New Delhi, it is a reminder to invest in its own capabilities.
The real drivers of regional power and relevance in the Indo-Pacific will remain comprehensive national power and equitable bilateral ties – not name changes.


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What does US Pacific Command name change mean for China and India?

From the left, a Royal Australian Air Force F-35A, a US Air Force F-35A Lightning II, a Japan Air Self-Defence Force F-35A, and a US Marine Corps F-35B Lightning II fly over the US Pacific Command area of responsibility during exercise Cope North on February 7. Photo: US Air Force

US Navy Admiral Samuel J. Paparo, commander of the then-named US Indo-Pacific Command, observes a cyber exercise as part of Super Garuda Shield on August 31, 2024, in Surabaya, Indonesia. Photo: Handout

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and India’s Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar are seen at the Quad foreign ministers’ meeting at Hyderabad House in New Delhi, India, on May 26. Photo: AFP/Getty Images/TNS

With the ‘Indo-Pacific’ label losing its lustre, China has an opportunity

US Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth speaks as Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles and British Defence Secretary John Healey look on during the Aukus meeting at the Pentagon in Washington, on December 10, 2025. Photo: AFP

(From left) Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong, Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio share a light moment amid a Quad ministerial meeting at Hyderabad House in New Delhi, India, on May 26. Photo: AP

India’s US$9 billion island megaport sharpens China’s ‘Malacca dilemma’

A coastline at Campbell Bay in Great Nicobar Island. India is planning a US$9 billion megaport, airport and city on the remote island. Photo: AFP

Workers building a road as part of India’s Great Nicobar Island project. Photo: AFP

Two liquefied natural gas tankers sail in the Malacca Strait, Malaysia, in April. Photo: EPA

Ships docked near Campbell Bay at Great Nicobar Island. Photo: AFP

A dense tree cover at the Campbell Bay National Park in Great Nicobar Island. Critics warn of the potential ecological damage caused by India’s planned US$9 billion megaport, airport and city on the island. Photo: AFP

As Asia’s strategic landscape evolves, what is the Quad’s purpose?

Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi attend a joint press conference following the Quad Foreign Ministers’ meeting at the Hyderabad House in New Delhi, India, on May 26. Photo: Reuters

An Indian official holds a file related to the Quad ministerial meeting during a memorandum of understanding signing ceremony between the US and India in New Delhi, on May 26. Photo: Reuters

Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong attends a joint press conference following the Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in New Delhi, India, on May 26. Photo: EPA

Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar shakes hands with his Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi (left) in New Delhi, India on August 18, 2025. Photo: Indian Foreign Ministry via AP

Past failures haunt Quad’s US$20 billion critical minerals push

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio holds a press conference during the Critical Minerals Ministerial meeting at the State Department in February. Photo: Reuters

Workers use heavy machinery to dig for rare earths at a mine in northern China’s Inner Mongolia autonomous region. Photo: AP 

US Undersecretary of State Jacob Helberg (centre) convenes a Pax Silica summit in Washington in December. Photo: Getty Images via AFP

A Covid-19 vaccine is prepared in Los Angeles, California in 2022. Analysts say the Quad’s past initiatives on Covid vaccine distribution and infrastructure investment “fell woefully short of their promises”. Photo: AFP

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Reverting to the long-used name reflects a more traditional maritime focus while prioritising deterring China, as the Quad loses relevance


Reverting to the long-used name reflects a more traditional maritime focus while prioritising deterring China, as the Quad loses relevance.


US Pacific Command

US military

Quadrilateral Security Dialogue

United States

Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (The Quad)

Defence

Donald Trump

Donald Trump’s China policy

Taiwan

US-India relations

India

US-China relations

Japan

China

Expresses the views, ideas and conclusions of the author. (Eg. Enough of Crazy Rich Asians, think of crazy poor Hongkongers.)


What does US Pacific Command name change mean for China and India?

.css-1c6uqr6{color:inherit;font-weight:inherit;font-size:inherit;font-family:inherit;line-height:inherit;overflow-wrap:break-word;}Reverting to the long-used name reflects a more traditional maritime focus while prioritising deterring China, as the Quad loses relevance

Reverting to the long-used name reflects a more traditional maritime focus while prioritising deterring China, as the Quad loses relevance