Why North Korea is rekindling China relations

Having invested significant diplomatic capital into ties with Russia in recent years, North Korea now seems to be pivoting back to China. Leader Kim Jong-un said his country places “the greatest value” on improving ties with Beijing. This shift came during Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s two-day visit to North Korea last week, where he met Kim and North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui. Notably, Wang’s visit marked his first to North Korea since 2019. In the intervening years of the Covid-19 pandemic, North Korea’s border closure and rapidly growing ties with Russia resulted in relations with Beijing taking a back seat. Meaningful exchanges remained minimal until last September, when Kim travelled to Beijing for a military parade alongside President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Even that occasion, however, appeared to be more image management than genuine rapprochement: Kim was interested in being seen standing between the leaders of two great powers, not necessarily in repairing a neglected relationship. A lot has changed since then, however. According to North Korean state media, Kim told Wang that Pyongyang places “top priority” on developing its traditional ties with China. Kim also reaffirmed his commitment to high-level strategic communication and voiced support for the one-China principle and Beijing’s vision for a multipolar world. Wang stressed that China is ready to enhance cooperation across multiple areas and promote regional peace and development. According to the Korean Central News Agency readout, he described bilateral relations as entering a “new phase”, pointing to last year’s Xi-Kim summit as the foundation. Several converging pressures appear to be driving Pyongyang’s recalibration. The most immediate is the ongoing US-Israeli conflict against Iran. North Korea has watched one of its few partners on the world stage, one it regards as part of a broader front against American power, face weeks of sustained military assault. The so-called “axis of upheaval”, sometimes called the CRINK grouping of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, is a looser arrangement than the label implies. But as that circle shrinks, the incentive to consolidate the partnerships that remain becomes more urgent. Among these partnerships, the alliance with China seems like a wise place to start. For Kim, there is also a deterrence logic at work. North Korea’s nuclear arsenal remains the primary guarantee of regime survival, but nuclear deterrence is strengthened by visible alliance commitments. A North Korea that is embedded in close strategic coordination with China and Russia presents a more complicated escalation calculus for the United States than one standing in effective isolation or relying overwhelmingly on one power. Pyongyang’s outreach could be an effort to reinforce this architecture. The timing of Wang’s visit also points to the anticipated Trump-Xi summit, expected to take place in China in May. Some speculate that US President Donald Trump may use the summit to explore renewed engagement with Pyongyang. For Pyongyang, which has suspended meaningful dialogue with Washington since the collapse of the Hanoi summit in 2019, the prospect of renewed talks is a double-edged sword. Kim has raised the bar on preconditions, but the Iran conflict has underscored what can happen when diplomatic efforts break down. The urgency of securing a favourable outcome, should diplomacy continue, gives Kim reason to ensure Xi is fully briefed on North Korean interests and prepared to act as an effective intermediary. Besides diplomatic reasons, another possible consideration for North Korea’s shift in China strategy could centre around energy concerns. Pyongyang reportedly requested large quantities of Russian crude oil and petroleum products last month, a likely indicator that Pyongyang is feeling the downstream effects of the Strait of Hormuz’s closure. If the disruption continues, Russia – whose export capacity could face increasing strain – may be unable to meet North Korea’s energy needs, despite their close friendship. China’s recent oil export restrictions notwithstanding, Beijing remains a viable alternative source of energy support. Wang’s visit may prove to have laid the groundwork for discussions on greater cooperation in the energy sector. While Pyongyang is signalling a return to closer ties with Beijing, this does not mean it will neglect relations with Moscow. The Russia-North Korea relationship has been too consequential – in arms transfers, troop deployments and political legitimation – for Kim to consider reversing it. Instead, Wang’s visit suggests a dual-track approach that places Russia as a source of military cooperation and strategic solidarity and China as the more durable economic lifeline and the more credible diplomatic partner when it counts. The two are not in tension from Kim’s perspective; they complement a strategy of managed survival. Beijing has its own interests in deepening relations. Aside from counterbalancing Russian influence, closer ties could benefit China’s interests with regard to the US. Visible influence over Pyongyang means genuine leverage heading into negotiations with Washington. If China is seen as the indispensable intermediary for Korean peninsula diplomacy, Xi gains leverage to manage US pressure on issues far more sensitive to Beijing, such as Taiwan. Moreover, as war in Iran disrupts the global economy, Xi has every incentive to prevent a comparable escalation in Northeast Asia. It’s too early to conclude the full significance of Wang’s visit. However, the signals from both sides are unusually direct. For Kim, the calculus is straightforward: in a world of shrinking options and rising risks, China is too important an ally to keep at arm’s length.

Why North Korea is rekindling China relations

.css-1c6uqr6{color:inherit;font-weight:inherit;font-size:inherit;font-family:inherit;line-height:inherit;overflow-wrap:break-word;}In a world of shrinking options and rising risks, Pyongyang recognises its alliance with Beijing is too important to ignore

In a world of shrinking options and rising risks, Pyongyang recognises its alliance with Beijing is too important to ignore