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Nicholas Ross Smith

Despite the Donald Trump administration’s unconventional foreign policy in his second term, Sun Yun – the director of the Stimson Centre’s China programme – recently argued that it is unlikely to have any ramifications for the United States’ military presence in the Indo-Pacific.
Given that Trump is eager to boost US power projection capabilities with the desired acquisition of Greenland, it is unfathomable that it would seek to change its current position in the Indo-Pacific. However, the Trump presidency might, somewhat unwittingly, have major ramifications for the overall geopolitical dynamics of the Indo-Pacific.
The important thing to understand about the Indo-Pacific is that it is not a natural regional geopolitical setting. At its maximalist definition – stretching from the east coast of Africa to the west coast of the Americas – the Indo-Pacific covers more than half the globe.
The Indo-Pacific, even in its more minimalist interpretations, is simply too large a geopolitical space to be conceived of as an interconnected region. Rather it should be thought of as a constellation of many regions, all of which have unique regional geopolitical dynamics.
Consequently, what has been pushing the changing geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific is not so much natural regional geopolitical dynamics but the increasing perception of China as a security threat by several like-minded powers – chiefly the US, Japan and Australia. In other words, the Indo-Pacific is a construct built on the supposed growing existential threat posed by China to the “rules-based order”.


Importantly, the Indo-Pacific construct differs significantly from the previously popular Asia-Pacific one because it stems from a pessimistic view of the future. The Asia-Pacific construct is based on a far more optimistic view of the future, at a time when the West was hopeful that China could be co-opted into the status quo system by becoming not only a trustworthy partner but a source of economic prosperity.
Japan, under the leadership of Shinzo Abe, was the first country to push the more pessimistic Indo-Pacific view – initially in 2007 but more concretely in 2012 – by proposing that Japan, Australia, India and the US state of Hawaii form a “diamond to safeguard the maritime commons stretching from the Indian Ocean region to the western Pacific” to counter Chinese “naval and territorial expansion”.
However, it was not until the US more firmly adopted an Indo-Pacific outlook in its 2017 national security strategy, revived the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue under Joe Biden’s presidency and also created Aukus, that the “securitisation” of the Indo-Pacific – where issues are increasingly framed as security threats – reached a point where existential anxiety and paranoia about the future became commonplace.
Ultimately, given its unrivalled power and influence, strategic decisions by the US create a far greater ripple effect than those of lesser powers, such as Japan, Australia and India. It was only after a strategic change in the US that New Zealand, France, the United Kingdom and the European Union also adopted Indo-Pacific strategic outlooks.

Although it is hard to accurately ascertain or predict what Trump’s foreign policy strategy is – given his penchant for non-linear and contradictory decision-making – it is plausible that when it comes to the Indo-Pacific, his presence in the Oval Office might work to de-escalate the situation.
Whereas the Indo-Pacific received a significant amount of attention under Biden, so far in Trump’s second term, it has been notably relegated behind the geopolitical flashpoints of Ukraine and Gaza and the ramping up of economic statecraft against an array of countries.
The most glaring example of the US potentially having an Indo-Pacific blind spot was on display during Trump’s meeting with British Prime Minister Keir Starmer in which he responded, “What does that mean?”, to a question about Aukus.
Countries that signed up for an Indo-Pacific outlook did so on the belief that they were aligning with a powerful and trustworthy ally in the US to balance the perceived threat of China. However, Trump’s treatment of close friends and allies of the US – such as Canada, Japan and the European Union – has left many countries reconsidering their strategic positions.




For example, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi recently suggested that the Sino-India relationship has returned to its previous standing of “normalcy” from before the 2020 border clashes in Galwan Valley. Japan and South Korea have also begun proactively engaging with China.
It is also possible that Trump will seek to make a deal with China, despite China being one of the clear targets of his tariff strategy so far. In a recent visit to Beijing, US senator Steve Daines stated that his trip was “the first step to an important next step, which will be a meeting between [President Xi Jinping] and President Trump.”
Murmurs from the White House suggest that Trump is keen to strike an agreement with China similar to the 2020 one he signed. This new desired deal would primarily focus on trade but also attach issues such as nuclear weapons security.
Even if a grand bargain between the US and China does not materialise, it seems that the underpinning dynamics that drove the geopolitical instability of the Indo-Pacific have receded significantly since Trump returned to power. While it is unlikely that it will prompt a return to the optimism of the Asia-Pacific construct, it should, at the very least, calm the existential anxiety and paranoia that has dominated the Indo-Pacific geopolitical space over the last few years.


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Donald Trump is likely to keep projecting power in Asia but his focus on other priorities will reshape regional dynamics


Donald Trump is likely to keep projecting power in Asia but his focus on other priorities will reshape regional dynamics.


Donald Trump

Donald Trump’s China policy

Defence

War and conflict

US-China trade war

China tariffs

Aukus alliance

Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (The Quad)

Keir Starmer

Narendra Modi

European Union

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Expresses the views, ideas and conclusions of the author. (Eg. Enough of Crazy Rich Asians, think of crazy poor Hongkongers.)


How Trump may inadvertently calm the waters of the Indo-Pacific

.css-1c6uqr6{color:inherit;font-weight:inherit;font-size:inherit;font-family:inherit;line-height:inherit;overflow-wrap:break-word;}Donald Trump is likely to keep projecting power in Asia but his focus on other priorities will reshape regional dynamics

Donald Trump is likely to keep projecting power in Asia but his focus on other priorities will reshape regional dynamics