China-North Korea relations start the new year on a new low

New year, new greetings. And the most notable feature of North Korea’s festive diplomacy is its emphasis on its relationship with Russia – and its downgrading of its ties with China. Clearly, Pyongyang intends to flatter Russia and pressure China to extract benefits from both while operating from a stronger position. This approach is reminiscent of the late Kim Il-sung’s tactics in securing maximum benefit from the Soviet Union and Mao-era China. When his grandson, Kim Jong-un, sent New Year greetings to Russian President Vladimir Putin on December 30, there was no mention of peace but instead an emphasis on hopes of a war victory and the “warmest comradely trust”. North Korean media reported: “Hoping that the new year 2025 will be recorded as the first year of war victory in the 21st century, when the Russian army and people defeat neo-Nazism and achieve a great victory, he wished Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin greater success in his responsible and heavy state leadership activities and the Russian people prosperity, well-being and happiness.” Kim repeatedly mentioned the strategic partnership with Russia, clearly aiming to highlight North Korea’s importance to Moscow and bolster its international status. In a heavily militaristic tone, Kim extended his “best wishes to the fraternal Russian people and all the service personnel of the brave Russian army in the name of his own, the Korean people and all the service personnel of the armed forces”. This voicing of support, from one army to another, emphasises Pyongyang’s contribution to Russia’s war effort, in particular, the sending of thousands of North Korean soldiers to fight Ukraine. It is a message to the world, including the United States, Japan, South Korea and China, that the new military alliance between Pyongyang and Moscow is going strong, and probably also meant to boost morale at home. Clearly, at least before Russia’s war on Ukraine ends, the atmosphere of cooperation between Russia and North Korea is likely to continue. For both parties, this is an objective necessity, with North Korea’s need being particularly strong. Given how relations have developed between the two countries over the past year, it is evident that their urgent, if temporary, needs have become the driving force of bilateral relations. Curiously, for several months after signing their comprehensive strategic partnership treaty in June last year, very little seemed to have been done to complete the legal procedures needed to approve the treaty. According to information I obtained at the Xiangshan Forum on defence in Beijing in September, at the time, the Russian parliament had not even scheduled a time to approve the legal procedures. Yet by early November, processes had been expedited and the treaty ratified. The most important driving force behind this was the unfavourable battlefield situation in the Russia-Ukraine war, as Ukraine forces invaded and occupied Russian territory in Kursk. North Korea, aware of the battlefield conditions, would have been actively courting Russia, seizing on Putin’s sensitivities around the incursion to achieve its own goals. But how long can North Korea practically rely on an alliance with Russia to safeguard its security after the Ukraine war ends? How valuable will North Korea be to Russia then? And how will China respond to Pyongyang’s recent attitudes and actions? China, which is acutely aware of Russian ambitions in developing its Far East, might consider responding before the war ends and the situation changes. In contrast to Kim’s New Year diplomacy with Russia, which included a state media report on former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev’s festive message, mention of China was downplayed. That Chinese President Xi Jinping and his wife sent Kim a card was reported as part of a list of unnamed senders that included the leaders of Vietnam and several Central Asian states. Xi and Peng Liyuan appeared on that list as “the general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China who is president of the People’s Republic of China and his wife”. While Kim’s festive message for Putin and Medvedev’s greeting for Kim were treated as major news, North Korean state media gave no details of the New Year greetings from Chinese leadership. Despite what must practically be daily contact between Pyongyang and Beijing, and in spite of North Korea’s dependence on China, Kim has chosen to publicly downplay the relationship. North Korea relies on China for trade and aid, and the remittances earned by North Korean workers in China. No other country comes close to matching China’s significance. The conclusion can only be that North Korea is doing this deliberately to put pressure on China and manoeuvre between it and Russia for profit. However, it is doubtful that Russia can offer North Korea greater development opportunities and resources than China does. In a sign of how low diplomatic relations have fallen, Kim appears to have set aside even the basic norms. Diplomatic etiquette demands that a country’s leader responds in writing to another’s New Year greetings. But North Korea has not disclosed if Kim has done so in response to Xi, nor can this information be found on the Chinese foreign ministry’s website. It would appear that Kim no longer cares about saving face when it comes to Pyongyang’s relationship with Beijing. The only reason for this, of course, is North Korea’s new treaty with Russia. For relations between China and North Korea, 2024 was a year of turbulence; much that is abnormal has happened and is still happening. How this bilateral relationship develops in 2025 is worthy of close observation. And lest it is forgotten, China holds many cards in the matter.

China-North Korea relations start the new year on a new low

.css-1c6uqr6{color:inherit;font-weight:inherit;font-size:inherit;font-family:inherit;line-height:inherit;overflow-wrap:break-word;}Between Kim’s outpourings to Putin and hardly a mention of Xi’s greeting is a message: North Korea cares little about saving face over relations with Beijing

Between Kim’s outpourings to Putin and hardly a mention of Xi’s greeting is a message: North Korea cares little about saving face over relations with Beijing