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Chan Young Bang

Anar Shaikenova

China is at a crossroads as the most important player on the Korean peninsula. It must either tolerate continuous belligerent escalations from North Korea backed with nuclear weapons or promote peace and stability through denuclearisation of the peninsula and diminish US influence in the region.
During the past two months, a whirlwind of profoundly important political events has occurred with far-reaching implications for the global order.
US president-elect Donald Trump’s return to power has ignited intense speculation and pre-emptive action regarding his promise to broker peace following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
In South Korea, President Yoon Suk-yeol’s declaration of martial law and subsequent impeachment has thrown the nation into political chaos. In Syria, rebel forces toppled president Bashar al-Assad’s regime, sending shock waves through the Middle East and Moscow. As a consequence of these events, five strategic variables mark a turning point for the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula and how China can act on it.
First, Trump’s second term will result in a political shift for the US. President Joe Biden’s objective in northeast Asia has been primarily to check China’s rise by forging alliances, such as the trilateral partnership with South Korea and Japan, and the Aukus defence pact with Australia and the UK. Trump’s regional policy will not be burdened with the rules-based order advocated by his predecessor.
In addition, Trump’s relationship with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un might lead to renewed talks. Most importantly, this shift could push South Korea and Japan to take more responsibility for their defence. Leaders of both countries have expressed an interest in joining the nuclear club to deter North Korea, and increased militarisation and nuclear expansion are not in China’s best interests.
Second, to sustain its war of attrition in Ukraine amid heavy economic sanctions and increasing isolation, Russia sought support from North Korea and the two sides have forged a closer alliance with this year’s signing of a mutual defence treaty. Pyongyang’s support for Moscow’s war recently transformed from the provision of ammunition and equipment to the dispatching of troops on the ground in the Kursk region.


However, relying on security guarantees from Russia was a serious misjudgment by Kim. Any alliance between the two countries holds limited economic value, with bilateral trade at just US$34.4 million in 2023. This transactional alliance is not based on ideological affinity but rather on strategic benefit, meaning its security guarantees are limited and will eventually end.
The third variable is Syria’s upheaval and the overthrow of Assad, who is seeking asylum in Russia. Moscow has lost a valuable ally and conduit in the Middle East. Compared with North Korea, Russia had made considerable military and economic investments in Syria, totalling US$27.5 billion over nine years – including two Russian military bases.
Moscow’s decision not to back up its security commitments to Assad has seriously eroded its image as a trusted ally. This has considerably shaken Iran and the so-called axis of resistance. Kim might see his Russian ally as unreliable in guaranteeing his regime’s security and could evaluate alternatives to ensure his survival.
Assad’s fall sends a clear message to Kim. Russia is caught up in its war with Ukraine, its economic performance has been undermined and it cannot provide a security umbrella to North Korea.


Fourth, Yoon’s proclamation of martial law in South Korea will also significantly affect the North’s future. Yoon’s days as president are numbered. The likely return of the Democratic Party in 2025 could improve South Korean and Chinese relations.
Yoon’s predecessor, Moon Jae-in, emphasised fostering peace and trying to ease tensions with Pyongyang and Beijing, in contrast to the security-centric, alliance-driven strategies of the Yoon administration. It should be noted that Moon’s Democratic Party has not been in favour of improving South Korea’s relationship with Japan and may not wish to continue Yoon’s initiative but instead choose to appease North Korea.
Finally, among the five variables, China’s positioning and strategic objectives play some of the most important roles. Beijing’s primary objectives are to secure peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and to reintegrate Taiwan. It cannot afford for the North Korea-Russia alliance to jeopardise its one-China principle.
Furthermore, China will not support or participate in a trilateral alliance, particularly given the erosion of Russian power following the events in Ukraine and Syria. China has been dealing with economic stagnation for several years. Its central economic work conference last week set the tone for 2025 as the government attempts to deal with persistently weak consumer demand, a years-long property crisis, weak investor sentiment and the looming threat of a second Trump administration continuing its trade war.




In that context, bringing about the denuclearisation of North Korea would require China to initiate rapprochement with South Korea and discourage Seoul’s involvement in any alliance with the US and Japan. It is a positive sign that China included South Korea among the nine countries whose citizens were last month granted visa-free entry for up to 15 days.
President Xi Jinping should embrace denuclearisation as the best strategic decision to optimise China’s position in the region. The weakening of the Russia-North Korea alliance, changes in the South Korean government and Trump’s second term create a conducive environment for denuclearisation talks.
The upending of the status quo presents an opportunity for renewed action. The interplay of these strategic variables will shape the future of diplomatic and denuclearisation efforts on the Korean peninsula.


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The weakening of the Russia-North Korea alliance, political change in South Korea and Trump’s return create a conducive environment for denuclearisation talks


The weakening of the Russia-North Korea alliance, political change in South Korea and Trump’s return create a conducive environment for denuclearisation talks.


China-South Korea relations

China-North Korea relations

Korean peninsula

North Korea

North Korea nuclear crisis

South Korea

South Korea martial law 2024

Kim Jong-un

Donald Trump

Japan

Yoon Suk-yeol

Russia

Moon Jae-in

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Ukraine war

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China should seize the moment to promote peace on Korean peninsula

.css-1c6uqr6{color:inherit;font-weight:inherit;font-size:inherit;font-family:inherit;line-height:inherit;overflow-wrap:break-word;}The weakening of the Russia-North Korea alliance, political change in South Korea and Trump’s return create a conducive environment for denuclearisation talks

The weakening of the Russia-North Korea alliance, political change in South Korea and Trump’s return create a conducive environment for denuclearisation talks