Nato needs allies in Asia but does it need an Indo-Pacific presence?

Nato is a transatlantic security apparatus at its core but, increasingly, there are calls for the alliance to expand into the Indo-Pacific, which has become the new centre of global attention. As Nato’s partners in the Asia -Pacific, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand attended its summit in Madrid, Spain, in 2022 for the first time and were again present at the summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, last year. Dubbed the “Asia-Pacific 4”, their inclusion underscored the rising importance of China in Nato’s strategic thinking, exemplified by its description of China as a “systemic challenge to Euro-Atlantic security” in 2022. In reality, Nato exists in Asia in all but name; its members are all linked, through security assurances or intelligence-sharing arrangements, to regional partners. The idea of Nato opening a liaison office in Tokyo sparked a strong reaction from within the alliance and without – some, including French President Emmanuel Macron, decried it as overreach and others thought it was a signal of the future of Nato’s priorities. As allies prepare for Nato’s 75th anniversary summit in Washington in July, they will need to articulate their vision for the alliance’s future in the Indo-Pacific. Nato members have collective and individual interests in the Indo-Pacific’s prosperity and security and will continue to play a role there, but the alliance needs to continue to strengthen its relationships and interoperability with partners in the region. While Nato has no formal remit in the Indo-Pacific, its members have security and defence arrangements with regional partners, reflecting the inextricable links between both regions. The 1951 ANZUS Treaty, for instance, for all its ambiguity, denotes a “common” response from Australia, New Zealand and the United States should any party be attacked within the Asia-Pacific. Though New Zealand is no longer effectively part of the treaty, ANZUS remains foundational to US-Australian defence relations and facilitates the annual Australia-US Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN), where defence and foreign secretaries discuss shared security concerns. The US also has a considerable military presence in Japan, South Korea and, on a rotational basis, the Philippines. A slew of new minilateral security arrangements have emerged in the Indo-Pacific, further complicating the likelihood of entangling alliances leading to Nato intervention. From the Aukus security pact between the United Kingdom, the US and Australia to provide the latter with nuclear-powered submarines, to the trilateral dialogue brokered by the US at Camp David with South Korea and Japan, and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between Australia, India, Japan and the US, more formats are emerging every few years. These have grown out of necessity but also as an alternative to the security framework proposed by China, including with Russia and North Korea. Reflecting Nato’s wider commitment to the rules-based order, including maritime freedom of navigation, its members have a vested interest, individually and collectively, in upholding regional economic and security stability. This raises the question of the strength of the link between the two spheres of European and Asia-Pacific security – would an extra-regional attack on US forces in Asia warrant a response from its European allies and Canada? It highlights a fundamental issue facing a potential alliance cohesion in response to an Indo-Pacific crisis. Though Nato states may feel inclined to support the US and regional partners, it is unclear whether Article 5 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty extends to an extra-regional “armed attack”. Hawaii in the Pacific Ocean, for instance, is excluded from Nato assurances despite being a sovereign US territory. Geographical limitations could have a significant impact on a Nato-wide response when it comes to its members’ operations in the Indo-Pacific. This highlights the urgent need for Nato to plan accordingly as Indo-Pacific tensions grow. The Vilnius summit last summer has strengthened Nato’s resolve in the Indo-Pacific. That meeting saw the creation of individually tailored partnership programmes for the “Asia-Pacific 4” aimed at addressing security concerns – namely China’s expanding presence in the region. Although Nato representatives are quick to point out that it is an Atlantic alliance, it has not stopped several members from publishing Indo-Pacific strategies. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, however, has emphasised the primacy of European security to Nato. This raises questions about to what extent European states can engage in the Indo-Pacific. Germany in particular has increased its Indo-Pacific defence in recent years, typified by the 2021 regional deployment of its frigate Bayern – an effort expected to be repeated with the anticipated voyage of another frigate and supply ship later this year. On systemic issues like climate change, many countries, including the US, foresee deepening multilateral ties with China to address rising sea levels, emissions thresholds, migration and global temperature rises. Cooperation and the avoidance of conflict is also an economic imperative for European Nato members, as an estimated 40 per cent of the European Union’s foreign trade transits through the South China Sea to access East Asian markets. The question is how European Nato powers can engage in constructive relations with Indo-Pacific allies without being automatically folded into US efforts to preserve regional influence. European countries are not as keen to take on China as the US, leading to some friction within Nato. There is a legitimate concern that Nato expanding into the Indo-Pacific is an overextension while a hot conflict is active on the European continent. Benedict Baxendale-Smith is a doctoral researcher at King’s College London in the Defence Studies Department, and the Cuthbert Collingwood associate fellow in maritime strategy at the Council on Geostrategy Jason C. Moyer is a programme associate for the Global Europe programme at The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Nato needs allies in Asia but does it need an Indo-Pacific presence?

.css-1mniedq{color:inherit;font-weight:inherit;font-size:inherit;font-family:inherit;line-height:inherit;}Nato members have vested interests in the region, individually and collectively, but an alliance expansion would raise complicated questions over collective defence and overreach

Nato members have vested interests in the region, individually and collectively, but an alliance expansion would raise complicated questions over collective defence and overreach