How Xi Jinping is going back to Confucius to define China’s future

For most of the 103-year history of the Communist Party of China, the teachings of the philosopher Confucius were deemed relics of a backwards past, with its leaders looking to Marxism and socialism to modernise China. But under President Xi Jinping’s leadership, Confucianism has made a dramatic comeback as the bedrock of imperial Chinese ethics and governance, and other Chinese classics have become the pillars of Beijing’s efforts to shore up its intellectual foundation and governance philosophy amid an intensifying ideological competition with the US-led West. One of the latest ventures is the Ruzang, or “Confucian Canon”, project to create the largest ever compilation of Confucian classics. The project, which has had the input of nearly 500 scholars since it was started in 2003, was significantly elevated in 2014 when Xi became the first Chinese president to throw his personal weight behind it. Within China, the project is reminiscent of similar immense canon projects undertaken only a few times in the past 2,000 years, and is set to become a major source of inspiration for better governance. Among those contributing to Ruzang are international scholars, with Beijing apparently aiming to appeal to overseas Chinese. But experts point to geopolitical tensions and a public opinion of Confucianism as a Han-centric idea as obstacles. The Ruzang project was first approved in 2003 by the Education Ministry under then president Hu Jintao and spearheaded by Chinese philosopher Tang Yijie, who pledged to compile all known Confucian classics while explaining the survival and development of the nation. Xi backed the project when he visited then 87-year-old Tang at Peking University in 2014, hailing it as “a very meaningful endeavour that carries forward Chinese civilisation”. Peking University vice-president Wang Bo took over the project from Tang after he died in 2014. Wang was chosen to make policy recommendations at October’s study session of the 24-man Politburo chaired by Xi, who spoke on the goal of turning China into a “cultural powerhouse” by 2035, drawing strength from Marxism and Chinese traditional heritage. So far, nearly 500 scholars from around 100 institutions in China, South Korea, Japan and Vietnam have collaborated on the project, with estimated costs around 150 million yuan (US$21 million). By April last year the first phase had compiled 510 influential Confucian writings into 282 volumes. The ongoing second phase aims to include an additional 160 works, resulting in a massive collection of about a billion characters – the largest of its kind in China’s history. The Confucian Canon is among China’s efforts to tap into its cultural and philosophical roots to strengthen national pride at home, dubbed by Xi as “Compilation of Classics in the Flourishing Age”. To many Chinese, Xi’s description brings to mind Chinese writing projects such as the “Five Classics” of Confucian works in the Han dynasty (206BC-AD220), the vast Yongle Dadian, an encyclopaedia commissioned under the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), and the Siku Quanshu, which was written in the 18th century during the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) and was the largest collection of books in imperial China. The Confucian Canon follows the basic structure of Siku Quanshu, categorising works from the pre-Qin dynasty to the end of the Qing dynasty, including original Confucian classics, works reflecting Confucian thought and literature related to governance, and personal conduct that reflects Confucianism, according to the Peking University Editorial and Research Centre of Confucian Canon. Some literature previously deemed non-Confucian – such as that of Tao Yuanming, traditionally a Taoist poet and politician; and Qi Jiguang, a Ming dynasty general who fought Japanese pirates – have been included because they reflect Confucian ideals. This scope presents a holistic view of Confucian thought over time, complete with editorial footnotes explaining each text’s significance. Meanwhile, the texts were also digitised, which could play a crucial role in making these ancient texts accessible to scholars and the public around the world, according to the centre’s interviews with multiple project editors. Confucianism’s changing role In various media interviews, Tang Yijie emphasised Confucianism’s influence on ancient Chinese politics, economics, and culture. He said that while historically Buddhist and Daoist canons had been compiled, there was no overarching Confucian Canon because resources had been limited. While the Ruzang project has academic benefits, analysts say it also encapsulates a broader narrative connected to China’s cultural renaissance and national security concerns amid the prevailing narrative war with the West. Stephen C. Angle, a professor of philosophy and East Asian Studies at Wesleyan University in the United States, notes that the project reflects both political motives and “a genuine desire … to re-energise” Confucianism as a source of theory and practice in Chinese society. “Confucianism must be seen as ‘progressive’, which means developing in response to modern social, economic and political changes,” he said. For centuries, Confucianism has served as the foundation of Chinese ethics and governance and influenced various dynasties. Confucius, born in 551BC, proposed a system based on hierarchy mixed with benevolence, a reflection of the importance of social harmony and moral integrity in governance. However, these principles faced being rejected during the revolutionary upheavals of the 20th century. “Chinese dynasties have typically relied on the Confucian canon for legitimacy. Only radical regimes, like the Communist Party in the 20th century, opposed this notion, particularly during the May Fourth Movement and Cultural Revolution,” said Rana Mitter, ST Lee Chair in US-Asia Relations at Harvard Kennedy School. While the official hostility towards Confucianism ended after the Cultural Revolution Chinese leaders in the subsequent decades mainly leaned towards the liberal democracy and capitalist model, said Daniel A. Bell, a chair professor at the University of Hong Kong. Bell is the author of The Dean of Shandong, an account of Chinese academia based on his experience at Shandong University from 2017 to 2022, when he was involved in promoting Confucianism through teaching and research. He said that since the 1990s, “Confucianism and communism mounted huge and unexpected comebacks” in a multipolar world, as China claimed it would not copy the West. According to Bell, who was last month elected vice-president of the International Confucian Association, politically Confucianism provides a “source of values-based legitimacy” that complements Marxism and psychologically, it addresses the “atomisation and moral vacuum” created by capitalist-style modernisation. The revival gained further traction in the 2000s under then president Hu’s “Harmonious Society” strategy alongside the establishment of Confucius Institutes worldwide. Since Xi assumed leadership in 2012, cultural initiatives have been emphasised as part of China’s national security, encompassing various dimensions. The resurgence of Confucianism culminated when Xi visited Qufu, Confucius’s birthplace, in eastern Shandong province in 2013 and made a speech on the 2,565th birthday of Confucius in September 2014 – the first time a Chinese president had taken part in celebrations marking Confucius’s birth. He personally endorsed the role of the sage and suggested Confucianism could offer solutions for global peace and development. “Confucianism is key to understanding the national characteristics of the Chinese as well as the historical roots of the spiritual world of the present-day Chinese,” he said during the 2014 celebration. He added that Confucianism had evolved and responded to the demands of the times. In that year, the Communist Party mandated that officials nationwide attend lectures on Confucius and other classical philosophers. Legalism – the school less discussed Xi has referred to classical texts so frequently that in 2015 and 2018, Communist Party mouthpiece People’s Daily compiled two volumes of quotes he used from important articles and speeches. Among the selected nearly 300 quotes, Confucianism is his most cited philosophy, followed by Legalism. While Beijing has not promoted the school of thought known as Legalism as prominently, some academics, such as Delia Lin from the University of Melbourne, argue that Xi combines both philosophies. Legalism is a pragmatic governance approach characterised by strict laws, centralised authority and the belief that human nature is inherently self-interested and could lead to chaos without proper control. Confucianism promotes moral leadership and social harmony, justifying the Communist Party’s authority through the idea of the virtuous ruler, or “sage-king”, aligned with Xi’s “rule by virtue”. In 2017, Lin wrote in a book chapter that “Confucianised Legalism” was the dual emphasis on moral education and firm legal structures that underpinned Xi’s governing framework. It enabled the Communist Party to claim both legitimacy and effectiveness in governance, and was highlighted in the 2014 fourth plenary session, which reinforced the commitment to “governing the country according to law”. In multiple speeches about governing by the law and anti-corruption, Xi has cited Legalism classics in defence of the hardline crackdown. “Today’s China under Xi Jinping is leaning into the idea of China as a source of traditional wisdom. This has tapped into a greater nationalist pride in China’s intellectual traditions more broadly in China,” said Harvard historian Mitter. Intellectual legitimacy Besides the canon project, in recent years there has been a slew of “Chinese culture projects” that all reinforce Beijing’s narrative of a continuous history with China a global power with ancient status. They include the “China Paintings through the Ages” series exhibited since 2022, a project that aims to document and preserve Chinese paintings from ancient times to the Qing dynasty. Additionally, the evacuation of archaeological sites such as Liangzhu serve as physical proof of China’s 5,000-year civilisation. These changes manifest that “modern China looks back to its civilisational heritage to extract wisdom that can inform its future,” according to Peter T.C. Chang, a visiting senior fellow with the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore. The ideological foundation of China was rooted in Leninist-Marxist thought, but the current leadership recognised the importance of the country’s indigenous traditions, especially Confucianism, he said. “This process marks a return to cultural roots, using the teachings of Confucianism and other traditional philosophies as guiding principles for China’s continued development and governance.” The key approach, in Xi’s own words, is to “Sinicise Marxism” through Chinese traditional culture, a process outlined in the “two combines” strategy introduced in 2021 during the party’s centenary. It was later added to Xi Jinping Thought on Culture, which was raised in October last year as the sixth pillar of the paramount leader’s political doctrine that has been enshrined in the constitution since 2018. The “first combine” adapts Marxism to China’s unique realities, exemplified by Deng Xiaoping’s reforms. The “second combine” coined by Xi integrates Marxism with traditional Chinese culture. At the symposium in June last year, Xi asserted: “This fusion has resulted in a distinctly Chinese style and character, with Sinicised Marxism becoming the essence of Chinese culture and spirit in contemporary times”. He also hailed China’s unique development path in its uninterrupted cultural continuity, creativity, unity, inclusiveness and peaceful nature. Limited influence abroad China’s ongoing revival of Confucianism also comes amid its struggle against Western narratives that frame China as “authoritarian” and resistant to modern democratic values. The canon project involves collaboration with scholars from South Korea, Japan and Vietnam, emphasising their shared cultural heritage. However, experts warn the project must be handled sensitively and with limited effects because of ongoing political disputes. The project aims to strengthen Chinese identity and pride in the achievements of Chinese civilisation while also emphasising common cultural ties with neighbouring countries, according to China observer Andrew Nathan, a Columbia University professor of political science. He said it might be difficult for the objectives of the project, while valid, to resonate beyond China’s borders. “When Chinese classics travelled to other neighbouring countries, they were reinterpreted and adapted in those countries, just as Chinese thinkers adapted Buddhism from India or Mao Zedong carried out the ‘Sinification of Marxism’,” he said, adding that the project should consider this variation in national traditions within the broader framework of Confucian thought. Germaine A. Hoston, a political-science professor at the University of California, San Diego, also underscored the need for sensitivity in recognising Confucian contributions across different countries in Asia to avoid undermining the legitimacy of the project. “It is important that such contributions are not disregarded or diminished in an effort to reassert Chinese military, political and cultural hegemony in the region,” she said. The influence of Confucianism beyond China – or not – is a subject of discussion among observers and academics. For Chang, Confucianism today remains largely a Han-centric sphere, despite its influence in Japan and South Korea. “To promote Confucianism globally without being perceived as a form of cultural hegemony, the tradition must undergo a process of ‘de-Sinicisation’,” ensuring that teachings were accessible through translations that facilitate engagement without cultural barriers, he said. Larger differences related to geopolitical and other disagreements may overshadow common heritage. According to Mitter, there has been “relatively little spillover effect, even in Asia,” as “China’s contemporary political disputes over war memory, territory and economics mean that neighbouring states prioritise those issues over ideas of shared common cultural heritage”. Outside Asia, Confucianism was increasingly being positioned as a “counterpoint” to Western narratives, particularly Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilisations” theory, Chang pointed out. “Xi Jinping’s vision of a ‘community of shared future for humanity’ draws upon Confucian values of harmony and coexistence. This philosophy provides an alternative Eastern world view that emphasises peaceful collaboration and mutual respect, contrasting with the more conflict-oriented outlook of some Western theories. “The Confucian principle of harmonious coexistence is thus being employed as a framework for advocating global unity over division,” he said. Another criticism of China’s attempts to promote traditional Chinese culture – especially Confucianism – is that it promotes state propaganda or “cultural hegemony”. For Angle, some of the criticism is justified “because too often, official representatives of Chinese culture have not acted in a confident way, but in a rigid way that refuses all questions or genuine dialogue”. Bell suggested there needed to be “Confucian-style ‘soft power’ – rule by virtue, moral example, ‘diversity in harmony’, personal freedom and political participation at the local level – to counter and soften centralising and totalising tendencies of China’s legalist tradition that advocates strong state power above all else”.

How Xi Jinping is going back to Confucius to define China’s future

.css-1c6uqr6{color:inherit;font-weight:inherit;font-size:inherit;font-family:inherit;line-height:inherit;overflow-wrap:break-word;}Xi’s plan to glorify China’s deep cultural roots is embodied in Ruzang, a compilation of the philosopher’s writings and related works

Xi’s plan to glorify China’s deep cultural roots is embodied in Ruzang, a compilation of the philosopher’s writings and related works