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Amber Wang

The People’s Liberation Army is just a year away from its centenary goals in its evolution into a “world-class” fighting force. In this part of a series, Amber Wang looks at the growing influence of artificial intelligence in combat and the private firms stepping into the area.
Roughly two months before the United States launched air strikes on Iran, a little-known Chinese technology company was watching an unusual pattern emerge on its screens.
Drawing on open-source intelligence and artificial intelligence-powered analysis, Hangzhou-based Jingan Technology said it had detected an unusually large concentration of US surveillance assets across the Middle East.
In a post published on its official account on January 6, Jingan suggested the build-up indicated that Washington “may already be in the midst of preparations for a potential military operation” – more than 50 days before the strikes took place.
Jingan has marketed its flagship product, the Jingqi Global Situational Awareness System, as a Chinese counterpart to operating systems such as Palantir Technologies’ Gotham and Anduril Industries’ Lattice.
While industry observers and military enthusiasts have cautioned against Jingan’s high-profile marketing claims, company materials and public disclosures suggest that its software has already been deployed within China’s public security system and state security apparatus, as well as some branches of the military.
Jingan is among a growing number of Chinese private tech firms entering the country’s rapidly expanding defence AI sector, driven by Beijing’s military-civil fusion strategy to integrate private companies into the defence industry.


Analysts say that some Chinese companies’ tech proficiency may be closing gaps with US counterparts like Palantir, but challenges remain for building an ecosystem capable of fully integrating such technology into operational decision-making.
According to Hu Bo, director of South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative (SCSPI), a leading Chinese think tank: “The gap doesn’t lie in the technology, but the United States is much further ahead in applying it, particularly in supporting decision-making.”
A turning point in modern warfare
Few defence software companies have attracted as much attention in recent years as US-based Palantir, which China’s defence sector follows closely.
Founded in 2003 in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, Palantir initially focused on providing large-scale intelligence analysis to combat terrorist attacks.
Now, its platforms are used across dozens of US government agencies including the Pentagon and several Nato allies, making Palantir one of the world’s most influential defence software companies.
The Pentagon has increasingly relied on Palantir’s Maven Smart System (MSS), with the company serving as an important contractor to gather intelligence, synthesise vast amounts of data and help commanders “make better and faster decisions”, according to US defence officials.
During the first 24 hours of the Iran conflict, the US used the MSS to help identify and strike more than 1,000 targets – a tenfold increase over what was possible before the system’s deployment – according to a June report by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
And in January, the US military used Claude during its special operation to capture Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro from Caracas through Anthropic’s partnership with Palantir, the Wall Street Journal reported.
Palantir has also helped Ukraine with AI-enabled air defence and combat data analysis projects in its war with Russia.
Its AI-enabled systems are designed to fuse satellite imagery, sensor feeds, intelligence reports and operational data into a unified picture, enabling faster target identification, more responsive command decisions and shorter decision cycles than earlier generations of military software.
Palantir chief technology officer Shyam Sankar has argued that the Iran conflict is likely to be remembered as the first major war in which artificial intelligence played a central operational role, marking a turning point in modern warfare.

In China, the country’s leadership has for years emphasised the “intelligentisation” of the People’s Liberation Army, alongside broader efforts to integrate emerging technologies into future combat capabilities.
However, exactly which AI models have been tested or deployed by the Chinese military – and the extent to which they have been incorporated into command-and-control systems – remains highly classified.
It is also impossible to know their performance on battlefields, as the country has not fought a full-scale war for more than four decades.
For Chinese military observers, recent global conflicts have reinforced an argument Beijing has advanced for years: future wars will be decided not only by weapons but also by the speed at which data can be transformed into operational decisions.
According to Yue Gang, a military analyst and retired PLA colonel: “The lesson here is that accelerating the intelligent transformation of the military is a matter of utmost urgency.”
Yue said recent armed conflicts showed how AI was becoming embedded throughout the battlefield, creating what he described as an “intelligent closed loop” linking intelligence, decision-making, strikes and support.
“In traditional warfare, the observe-orient-decide-act (Ooda) loop is measured in hours or even days. However, in modern conflicts, AI-assisted systems can compress this cycle to just seconds.”
“Data fusion, situational awareness and decision support represent the strategic high ground of future military competition,” he added.
At the same time, Yue warned, the reliability of AI-assisted target recognition was still a critical concern.
Other analysts voiced greater caution about the extent to which these systems have transformed the battlefield.
“When it comes to the actual impact of Palantir and Project Maven, the reality may not be as dramatic as media portrayals suggest. Human intelligence remains absolutely vital,” Hu of the SCSPI said.
While China broadly supports accelerating AI’s integration into the military, it also advocates a measured approach, arguing that humans should stay firmly “in the loop” and retain ultimate authority over the use of lethal force.

A Chinese Palantir?
As Palantir’s more prominent role on the battlefield has drawn global attention, Chinese entrepreneurs and investors have pointed to similar software as a strategic capability that China should develop.
But they are operating within a very different ecosystem, one shaped by Beijing’s military-civil fusion strategy, state-led procurement networks and the PLA’s evolving vision of intelligent warfare.
Today, hundreds of Chinese private technology companies are involved in defence projects, ranging from data fusion and autonomous systems to AI-assisted training and battlefield simulation.
Only a handful, however, have been described as China’s answer to Palantir.
Even then, analysts have expressed caution about their actual abilities and the extent to which their products have been adopted by the Chinese military.
One of the most prominent examples is Jingan Technology.
Founded in Hangzhou in 2021, the company was established by a group of engineers from leading Chinese tech firms with an initial focus on “urban security” applications such as summit security support, infrastructure protection and public security, according to company statements.
Like Palantir, the company’s name carries symbolic meaning. “Jingan” echoes a fictional Tang dynasty (618-907) public security institution popularised in a Chinese television drama.
The company has also recruited former personnel from the military, police and intelligence communities, according to its public introductions.
Jingan maintained a relatively low public profile until the outbreak of the Iran conflict, when it published a post claiming that its AI-powered analysis had predicted the US strikes more than 50 days in advance.
According to company materials, the system used in that analysis – its flagship “Jingqi” platform – is an AI-enabled command-and-control system that integrates satellite imagery, sensor feeds and multiple other data sources to provide real-time situational awareness, operational planning and decision support.

The company describes the platform as comparable to Anduril’s Lattice and Palantir’s Gotham. It has also been described by some Chinese media reports as “China’s Palantir”.
Similar to Palantir’s early development, Jingan initially focused on civilian security and policing rather than military applications.
According to company materials, its products have been deployed in cooperation with local public security bureaus, integrating thousands of police devices across multiple police stations in a major municipality.
Reported applications include responding to daily emergency incidents, supporting security operations for major public events and providing technical support during the coronavirus pandemic.
But over time, the company’s business appeared to have expanded into defence-related projects, and now the company introduces itself as a “defence tech” firm rather than its previous “urban security” label.
Publicly available information suggests Jingan has taken part in a project involving a radar monitoring station of the PLA’s former Strategic Support Force (SSF).
The SSF previously oversaw many of China’s space, cyber, electronic warfare and psychological operations arms before being dissolved in 2024, with its functions redistributed into the Information Support Force, the Aerospace Force and the Cyberspace Force.
Jingan’s customers include several of China’s biggest state-owned defence conglomerates, according to company materials.
Norinco, China Electronics Technology Group, China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation, China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation and China South Industries Group Corporation are among the customers, according to media reports.
The company has also gained momentum commercially.
In March, it announced the completion of a Series A+ funding round worth tens of millions of yuan, backed by a Chinese semiconductor manufacturer, bringing its total disclosed funding to about 300 million yuan (US$44.3 million).
Jingan is not alone.


Another Hangzhou-based company, MizarVision, which specialises in analysing commercial satellite imagery, has similarly attracted attention through its open-source intelligence analysis of American military deployments during the Iran conflict.
In May, the US Treasury added the company to its Specially Designated Nationals list, accusing it of publishing open-source imagery detailing American military activity during Operation Epic Fury.
Instead of challenging US sanctions in court, MizarVision took it as a badge of honour and highlighted the sanction in its recruitment campaign.
The South China Morning Post has contacted both Jingan and MizarVision for comment.
Another example is Beijing-based start-up EverReach AI.
During a defence technology exhibition in Beijing last year, the company showcased an AI-assisted military training platform using a flight map near the Taiwan Strait as one of its product demonstrations.
The presentation appeared to show how the system could support planning and evaluation of military exercises around Taiwan.
Beijing sees Taiwan as part of China to be reunited by force if necessary. Most countries, including the US, do not recognise Taiwan as an independent state, but Washington is opposed to any attempt to take the self-ruled island by force and is committed to supplying it with weapons.
A ‘very narrow’ path
Some investors view defence technology as one of China’s most promising long-term industries.
In 2022, Lu Di, CEO of Miracle Capital, described advanced defence technology as a pillar of national power.
“China is still in the early stages of developing this sector, but the potential is enormous,” Lu said at the time.


Despite rapid advances in China’s defence AI sector, some analysts argue that the gap with the US lies less in technological capability than in how AI is integrated into military operations.
“Their ultimate goal remains to serve the military, but the path is very narrow,” Hu said of the private defence tech firms’ ambitions.
The more significant gap was in operational integration, he added.
“Without large-scale military operations conducted by China, there is simply no operational environment in which to deploy and validate these applications.
“Where the US is applying this technology much more deeply than we are is in decision support and direct participation in decision-making,” Hu said.
Institutional challenges also persist within the PLA itself.
A commentary by the official PLA Daily in June pointed to enduring problems, including duplicated development of AI models across various military branches, limited interoperability and a lack of coordination between services.
Fu Qianshao, a Chinese military analyst, said future efforts should focus on integration.
“While every individual platform possesses its own ‘brain’, there ultimately needs to be a central command-and-control platform, a master brain, to coordinate overall decision-making,” Fu said.
China would also continue to draw lessons from America’s experience, he added, while pursuing its own technological road map.
“China’s AI development has its own characteristics, planning and path,” Fu said. “We are certainly working on it as well.”
The rise of companies such as Jingan reflects Beijing’s broader military-civil fusion strategy, which seeks to channel private-sector innovation into national defence.




But industry participants said business realities were another major obstacle.
Speaking on condition of anonymity, an employee at a leading Chinese tech company said the military’s control of costs and long procurement cycles had become major challenges for private defence tech firms seeking to become military contractors.
“The military is controlling procurement costs, while research and development requires substantial long-term investment,” the employee said.
The PLA has also made more of an effort to regulate the procurement sector.
In June, Xiamen-based AI company Yuanting Information Technology was barred from taking part in military procurement for three years after authorities found it had engaged in bid-rigging.
Many of the challenges mirror those faced by the Pentagon when it first sought to introduce AI into military operations.
Project Maven, launched in 2017, encountered years of bureaucratic resistance, procurement hurdles and organisational inertia before becoming one of the Pentagon’s flagship AI programmes.
As retired US Marine Corps Colonel Drew Cukor, who served as the founding chief of Project Maven, wrote in Fortune in May: “What made Maven different wasn’t the technology. It was the decision to treat AI not as an experiment to be managed but as an organisational transformation to be owned.”
For Chinese analysts, the lesson is not simply to replicate US technology but to build institutions that can integrate it while simultaneously regulating AI risks.
“We will continue developing our own capabilities while learning from the strengths of the United States and overcoming our own shortcomings,” Fu said.
Yue, the retired PLA colonel, argued that military-civil fusion was becoming the dominant model for China’s defence innovation.
China should continue to prioritise “human-in-the-loop” collaboration over complete machine autonomy, he said, while building an “independent and secure” military AI ecosystem alongside regulatory safeguards and risk-control mechanisms.


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Some mainland companies’ tech proficiency may be closing gaps with American counterparts, but challenges remain, analysts say


Some mainland companies’ tech proficiency may be closing gaps with American counterparts, but challenges remain, analysts say.


.css-1c6uqr6{color:inherit;font-weight:inherit;font-size:inherit;font-family:inherit;line-height:inherit;overflow-wrap:break-word;}Some mainland companies’ tech proficiency may be closing gaps with American counterparts, but challenges remain, analysts say

Some mainland companies’ tech proficiency may be closing gaps with American counterparts, but challenges remain, analysts say