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Shi Jiangtao

China’s muted response to North Korea’s latest missile launch, which came soon after top diplomat Wang Yi’s visit to Seoul, underscores how Beijing is prioritising Pyongyang’s stability over near‑term denuclearisation, according to analysts.
North Korea started launching more than 10 short-range ballistic missiles just hours after Wang concluded his two-day visit on Thursday, the foreign minister’s first official trip to South Korea in nearly five years.
South Korea and Japan condemned the launch as a provocation.
Beijing declined to criticise the barrage fired into the sea east of the peninsula, with China’s foreign ministry saying the following day that it had “noted the reports” and did not have any “new comment”.
The launch highlighted the gap between Beijing’s diplomatic engagement with both Koreas and its ability, or willingness, to restrain North Korea, said Lee Seong‑hyon, a senior fellow at George H.W. Bush Foundation for US-China Relations.
During his meetings in Seoul, Wang urged South Korea to pursue “genuine strategic autonomy”, avoid taking sides between China and the United States and move towards “peaceful coexistence” with its northern neighbour.


He also called on Washington to abandon what Beijing calls its “hostile policy” towards Pyongyang, but did not endorse Seoul’s call for multilateral talks involving the North.
“Wang Yi’s visit … represents a necessary effort at diplomatic stabilisation and risk management,” Lee said. “For Seoul, maintaining open, predictable channels with Beijing is essential for regional stability and economic continuity. However, the strategic limits of this diplomatic engagement were underscored almost immediately.”
Seoul’s dialogue with Beijing remained indispensable for crisis communication, Lee argued, but it “cannot serve as a substitute for robust, sovereign deterrence”.
The episode also drew attention to Beijing’s systematic omission of “denuclearisation” from its official readouts.
The same pattern was apparent during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Pyongyang in June, his first in seven years. Xi and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un emphasised closer strategic coordination and economic cooperation without referring to Pyongyang’s nuclear programme.
Lee described China’s approach as a shift towards managing North Korea’s nuclear reality and prioritising both regime stability and Beijing’s broader strategic interests, rather than pushing for near‑term disarmament, a posture he termed “structural acquiescence”.
IIn an analysis for Taiwan’s Prospect Foundation last month, Lee argued that China was not formally recognising North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state but it was putting Pyongyang’s regime stability, bilateral coordination and the US-China rivalry ahead of any near-term push for denuclearisation.


That closer relationship provided Pyongyang with what Lee called a more secure “strategic rear”, allowing it to engage selectively with Seoul, Washington and Tokyo while reducing China’s incentive to pressure North Korea over its nuclear arsenal.
Other analysts have reached similar conclusions.
Zhao Tong, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told the American broadcaster NPR in June that China thought that North Korea’s nuclear issue was mainly a problem for the US and South Korea more than for itself.
Still, this shift does not mean it welcomes Kim’s reckless escalation, as Beijing remains wary of regime collapse or a refugee crisis on its border, as well as the risk that conflict could drive closer military cooperation among Washington, Seoul and Tokyo.


At the same time, China has sought to prevent South Korea’s alliance commitments with the United States from automatically extending to broader containment measures such as advanced semiconductor restrictions, supply-chain restructuring or Taiwan contingencies, Lee told the South China Morning Post.
The challenge for Seoul, therefore, was to maintain engagement with Beijing without making a zero‑sum choice or assuming that Beijing would resolve the security problems posed by Pyongyang, Lee said.


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China-North Korea relations

Why was China’s response to North Korea’s latest missile launches so muted?

People watch a television screen showing a news broadcast with file footage of a North Korean missile test, at a train station in Seoul on August 20, 2026. North Korea fired around 10 short-range ballistic missiles, South Korea’s military said on August 20, hours after US President Donald Trump said he would meet Pyongyang’s leader Kim Jong Un later this year. Photo: AFP

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Missile tests hours after China’s foreign minister left Seoul won’t alter Beijing’s focus on regime stability, analysts say


Missile tests hours after China’s foreign minister left Seoul won’t alter Beijing’s focus on regime stability, analysts say.


Why was China’s response to North Korea’s latest missile launches so muted?

.css-1c6uqr6{color:inherit;font-weight:inherit;font-size:inherit;font-family:inherit;line-height:inherit;overflow-wrap:break-word;}Missile tests hours after China’s foreign minister left Seoul won’t alter Beijing’s focus on regime stability, analysts say

Missile tests hours after China’s foreign minister left Seoul won’t alter Beijing’s focus on regime stability, analysts say