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Fan Chen

The US push to promote “burden sharing” among its allies in the Indo-Pacific has seen it focusing on increasing its military capacity while lowering the political temperature in an effort to reassure its allies.
But some analysts have questioned its chances of succeeding, arguing that this deterrence strategy has intensified great power rivalry and polarisation in the region, while driving deeper bilateral cooperation between China and Russia on the one hand and Russia and North Korea on the other.
During a recent tour of Southeast Asia, defence undersecretary for policy Elbridge Colby told a forum in the Philippines that the United States was looking for “partners, not protectorates” and urged its allies to boost defence spending.
The message was echoed at an online press briefing on Thursday, when he said that instead of shaping the US military for regime change, Washington was prioritising “burden sharing” now that it realised its allies “can and are prepared to do more”.
Colby also visited Thailand, Indonesia, and Cambodia during his visit, vowing to deepen security ties with each nation.
His comments suggested that the US would keep its security guarantees in place, but wanted allies to improve their ability to conduct air defence, anti-ship and reconnaissance operations, while utilising base structural capacity to provide logistics support, according to Sun Chenghao, a fellow at Tsinghua University’s Centre for International Security and Strategy.
This stemmed from both military considerations and resource constraints, he added, as the US “cannot indefinitely shoulder Asia’s security costs” amid its war in the Middle East and other international commitments.
“This model is more pragmatic, but it also heightens regional concerns about being drawn into major-power military conflict,” Sun said.
Colby, a long-time China hawk, avoided mentioning China in both his speech and press briefing.
When asked about the omission, he said the White House was not interested in “peacocking” or “unnecessarily pressurising the rhetorical environment”.
He added: “Our approach in the Trump administration … is all about quietly, relentlessly increasing deterrent strength and capability.”




Sun said Beijing might interpret this stance as a sign that even though both countries were trying to strengthen their militaries, the competition between them was being “deliberately toned down politically, which helps to mitigate the security dilemma and reduce the risk of crisis escalation”.
He added that this approach was intended to make Washington’s strategy more acceptable to risk-averse Southeast Asian countries.
“Most Southeast Asian nations seek enhanced security cooperation with the US, but strongly resist being forced to pick sides between Washington and Beijing,” Sun stressed.
“If the US loudly frames regional cooperation as ‘containing China’, it would actually undercut these nations’ willingness to participate.”
Xiang Haoyu, a special research fellow of the China Institute of International Studies – a think tank affiliated with the foreign ministry – said Washington’s deterrence strategy had expanded to an alliance-centred model, shifting from Cold War umbrella protection to a networked defence system shared with key alliances and partnerships like the Quad and Aukus.
This approach enabled the US to maintain regional dominance at a lower cost amid China’s rapid military expansion and a shrinking US defence industrial base, Xiang wrote in a paper published in the Journal of Asia-Pacific Security and Maritime Affairs in May.
The aim was “to transform fragmented ally and partner resources into a composite, networked force of denial”, he wrote.
Under such a framework, security commitments – often largely confined to political declarations – were translated into institutionalised and routine joint operational planning and crisis response mechanisms, he argued.
In recent years, Washington has stepped up military drills with its allies in Asia, increasing both their frequency and scale.
For instance, this year’s joint US-Philippine Balikatan exercise was the largest on record while the biennial US-led Rim of the Pacific exercise that wrapped up last month featured 30,000 personnel from an unprecedented 30 nations.
But Xiang argued that the US faced several structural constraints, including the sustainability of its military investment, diverging strategic interests between Washington and its allies, and varying appetites for containing China.


In addition, US deterrence credibility risked being eroded by President Donald Trump’s “America first” policy and his transactional style, he said.
Washington’s shift in its strategy has also escalated regional military spending and nuclear risks, making great-power competition and bloc polarisation more pronounced, Xiang wrote.
China and Russia ties are growing closer, with the two carrying out regular joint exercises as well as air and sea patrols. Moscow and Pyongyang have also ramped up their defence ties, with North Korea providing troops and weapons to support Russia’s war against Ukraine.
Meanwhile, China has also sought to improve ties with North Korea, with President Xi Jinping making his first visit to the country since 2019 in June.
Xiang wrote: “As the US-China strategic rivalry deepens, the targeted military deterrence posture deployed by the US and its allies along the Asia-Pacific frontline has not only heightened China’s vigilance and defensive precautions, but also driven an upgrade in China-Russia strategic coordination and strengthened alliance-style cooperation between Russia and North Korea.
“In effect, this is pushing the regional security architecture in the Asia-Pacific towards major-power competition and bloc confrontation.”
Nevertheless, Xiang said the situation in the Asia-Pacific region could not be compared with the Cold War because Beijing had no intention of engaging in bloc confrontation with Washington.
He also pointed out that Russia, China and North Korea had not tried to build a three-way military alliance.


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Washington may be ‘toning down’ its China rhetoric and seeking deterrence via allied capacity, but observers warn of deeper polarisation


Washington may be ‘toning down’ its China rhetoric and seeking deterrence via allied capacity, but observers warn of deeper polarisation.


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The Philippines

Why US Indo-Pacific ‘burden sharing’ risks deepening polarisation and big power rivalry

.css-1c6uqr6{color:inherit;font-weight:inherit;font-size:inherit;font-family:inherit;line-height:inherit;overflow-wrap:break-word;}Washington may be ‘toning down’ its China rhetoric and seeking deterrence via allied capacity, but observers warn of deeper polarisation

Washington may be ‘toning down’ its China rhetoric and seeking deterrence via allied capacity, but observers warn of deeper polarisation