Opinion | From ‘strategic patience’ to ‘maximum pressure’: obstacles to progress remain in pushing North Korea on its nuclear weapons

Nobody was surprised when, on November 16, the ruling Workers Party of Korea announced that Kim Jong-un had “supervised a newly developed ultra-modern tactical weapon test”.

North Korea deems itself to be a fully fledged nuclear power. A “tactical” test of an unidentified weapon reinforces the fact that its nuclear weapons are not going anywhere for now, so long as the gap remains in how Pyongyang and Washington (and its allies) define denuclearisation.

While incremental movement in inter-Korean relations through economic cooperation may have been unimaginable a year ago, cautious optimism is key.

We should not expect assisting Pyongyang’s economic development to lead to nuclear concessions easily; the heart of North Korea’s byungjin policy is parallel nuclear and economic development. Moreover, we should not forget the power of alliances, particularly between Beijing and Pyongyang. While frosty at times, it is of critical importance in keeping the status quo on the Korean peninsula.

Two of the many obstacles for progress on the North Korean nuclear issue must not go unnoticed. The first, which sceptics are right to stress, is the stringency of UN Security Council economic sanctions, particularly those that restrict economic engagement with North Korea.

Pyongyang and Beijing have sounded many calls for their easing, yet Washington has refused to give leeway. Yet, is the damage of sanctions enough to warrant North Korea conceding the “icing on the cake” that is its nuclear programme, essential to its self-perception as a nuclear power?