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Huizhao Huang

Xiaofei Xu

Officials in Berlin are reportedly mapping out industries where China is still dependent on German suppliers, as they search for the same kind of chokepoints Beijing has spent years accumulating in Europe.
But while European analysts deemed the search long overdue, some warned that any leverage it found would be both hard to use and shorter-lived than Berlin hoped.
The reported search comes amid escalating trade tensions and increasing concerns in Germany about losing its industrial base to Chinese competition.
Bloomberg reported last week that Berlin was analysing areas in which China still depends on European technology and industrial know-how. Initial findings identified Trumpf and Zeiss, both suppliers to Dutch chip-equipment maker ASML. Chip firms Siltronic, Aixtron and SUSS MicroTec could also be included.
The German ministry of economic affairs declined to comment on the report, saying the government was pursuing “targeted risk reduction” on critical dependencies on China and used “a variety of indicators” to assess them. It added that doing so required “active engagement from industry”.
Trumpf said it exported only standard products to China, and had “not been asked by the German government to disclose differentiated supply chains”.
I do not want a new trade conflict with China, but I do want an open dialogue about these imbalances
Friedrich Merz, Chancellor of Germany
Other firms mentioned in the report did not reply immediately to the South China Morning Post.
A wider list compiled by Bloomberg spanned chemicals, industrial automation and automotive technology, including BASF, Bosch and ZF Friedrichshafen.
However, even if Germany identified the chokepoints, they could prove both difficult to use and hard to preserve, said Tobias Gehrke, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations.
“An analogous near-perfect chokepoint to China’s minerals is either unlikely to be found or unlikely to be leverageable in the same way,” he said, noting that minerals sit far upstream whereas disruptions ripple quickly through downstream industries.
Many of the companies named are themselves deeply tied to China. Aixtron, for example, described Chinese demand as a “stabilising factor” amid weak Western markets in its latest annual report. Many have production or research facilities in China, raising questions over whether export controls could be bypassed by shifting production to Chinese plants, Gehrke said.
The advantages these companies hold might also be eroding. European niche industry leaders often rely on larger, lower-value businesses to sustain their specialist operations, but even those markets are increasingly under pressure from Chinese competitors.

Gehrke pointed to Wacker Chemie, the world’s leading producer of ultra-pure silicon for semiconductors, whose broader business also relies on lower-value silicon used in solar panels – a market under intense pressure from Chinese producers.
“If the low-value business is being destroyed, it becomes harder to keep the niche business afloat as well, and thus pressure to localise in China increases,” he said, adding that medical devices, machine tools and chemicals could already be in jeopardy.
Nevertheless, others said the fact that leverage might be difficult to use was not an argument against finding them.
“I think it is indispensable to map our chokepoint landscape – we should have done this for years already,” said Juergen Matthes, head of international economic policy at the German Economic Institute. “Not to use those chokepoints, but to have cards in our sleeves in case China should choose escalation.”
He argued that Beijing had deepened Europe’s dependence over many years and was continuing that strategy. In base chemicals, European producers had been “strategically undercut with dumping strategies”, adding to the mounting pressure on Europe’s remaining production capacity, according to Matthes.
That thinking is increasingly being reflected in Berlin. Chancellor Friedrich Merz has pushed for a joint road map with France on trade defence, due in September, while repeatedly raising China’s trade surplus amid what he called a “drastically undervalued” yuan.
The EU must ensure the trade tools it deploys are impactful, it must manage the escalatory dynamic with Beijing
Noah Barkin, Rhodium Group
“I do not want a new trade conflict with China, but I do want an open dialogue about these imbalances,” Merz said last month. “I am not prepared to accept that things can remain as they currently are.”
Meanwhile, Beijing is “acutely aware” of its own vulnerabilities, said Jacob Gunter, head of programme for economy and industry at the Berlin-based Mercator Institute for China Studies. Preparing comparable measures would give Europe space to pursue de-risking, he said, provided it could convince Beijing it would actually fight back.
But the true problem, others said, was whether Europe had the ability to use those cards.
Activating a chokepoint requires “close, structured coordination between governments and industry” which many European countries lack, according to Noah Barkin, a senior adviser at the Berlin-based Rhodium Group.
Divisions also remain in Berlin over how far to push trade measures, he said, with the economic affairs ministry resisting tougher action. “It is unclear, when push comes to shove, how Berlin will lean.”
Brussels and Beijing have set an October deadline for tangible progress on trade imbalances. Barkin warned that the EU risked getting “bogged down in endless talks with Beijing that lead nowhere”.
“The EU must ensure the trade tools it deploys are impactful, it must manage the escalatory dynamic with Beijing, and it must keep nervous member states on board,” he said. “It is a massive challenge.”


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Although many analysts deem the search long overdue, they warn that German leverage would be both hard to implement and short-lived


Although many analysts deem the search long overdue, they warn that German leverage would be both hard to implement and short-lived.


Germany may be searching its supply chains for leverage on China. Will it find any?

.css-1c6uqr6{color:inherit;font-weight:inherit;font-size:inherit;font-family:inherit;line-height:inherit;overflow-wrap:break-word;}Although many analysts deem the search long overdue, they warn that German leverage would be both hard to implement and short-lived

Although many analysts deem the search long overdue, they warn that German leverage would be both hard to implement and short-lived