Opinion | As South China Sea risks rise, rival claimants have a way out – compromise

While China is doubling down on its claims to much of the South China Sea, rival claimants are enhancing their military capabilities and collaborating with the US

China, its rival claimants and the US can and must compromise – the alternative is to see China’s absolute hegemony or a universally catastrophic conflict

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Published: 9:15am, 6 May 2023

China’s position, policy and practices in the South China Sea have become counterproductive to its attempts to enhance its soft power and relations with Southeast Asia. Still, it continues them and has even doubled down on its historical claim to much of the sea – a claim rejected by a Permanent Court of Arbitration panel in 2016 – by enforcing it with its maritime militia, coastguard and even, occasionally, its navy.

China’s rival claimants – Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam – are pushing back with steps such as enhanced military presence and upgrades, or collaborating with the United States and other outside powers. This increasing militarisation of the South China Sea disputes sets the stage for the worst-case scenario – frequent and widespread conflict that eventually results in a military confrontation between China and the US.

Meanwhile, China is trying to build soft power in the region. It has stepped up its economic and diplomatic efforts via its Belt and Road Initiative to persuade its rival South China Sea claimants to compromise and recognise its interests and concerns. It is proposing an inclusive Indo-Pacific as an alternative to the US vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific that excludes China.

Foreign Minister Qin Gang has renewed diplomatic efforts to broaden and deepen engagement with Southeast Asia, including rival claimants, and pledged to keep the South China Sea peaceful and stable. China has proposed a Global Security Initiative that includes a promise “to conduct bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with all countries and international and regional organisations”.

As a counter to what it sees as US-led cabals against it, China may even try to build its own economic and security grouping in the region, beginning with the China-leaning Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar. It could try to persuade Thailand to join it and Vietnam to at least remain neutral.

But if these soft-power efforts do not persuade its rivals to compromise on their claims, it may well decide to do whatever it takes to achieve its interests in the South China Sea. This would be a realisation of what Thucydides referred to: “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” It could well mean the heavy-handed use of China’s military “stick” and economic might to reward and punish “uncooperative” rival claimants.