China’s banking debt crisis is a ticking time bomb that must be defused with urgent financial-sector reforms
- The spate of bank rescues, from Baoshang to HengFeng, is only the tip of the iceberg as slowing economic growth unearths more bad loans. The monetary fixes of the 1990s do not work without hypergrowth. The only solution? Unflinching banking-sector reforms
But, setting aside China’s slowdown, the real economic peril has been significantly downplayed: there is a looming crisis in China’s banking sector.
For a long time, policymakers have conspicuously given the banking sector preferential treatment. The large gap in interest rates for deposits and loans has created a lucrative cushion, making banking one of the most profitable sectors. From 1996 to 2018, China’s one-year lending interest rate was, on average, 3.1 percentage points higher than the deposit rate. At its widest, the gap was 3.6 percentage points, and has remained at 2.85 percentage points since 2014.
According to the People’s Bank of China 2019 Financial Stability Report, non-performing loans at commercial banks had risen to 2.03 trillion yuan by the end of 2018, while special-mentioned loans – those potentially at risk of not performing – at financial institutions had increased to 5.27 trillion yuan. The number of non-performing loans has risen sharply since 2012 and, until the first half of 2019, showed no sign of letting up.
Furthermore, in a stress test conducted by the PBOC in the first half of 2019 on 1,171 commercial banks, 7.7 per cent were assessed as being at extreme risk and incapable of withstanding a light shock, while 13.6 per cent would fail to bear up in a financial crisis.
