Opinion | India’s South China Sea policy has not changed. Now, as before, there’s no appetite to challenge China

India’s back-to-back moves to boost relations with Japan and Russia, particularly in security matters, appear to indicate it wants a bigger naval role in the contested South China Sea to counter a rising China. The reality is far different

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Visiting Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi speaks to Chinese President Xi Jinping in Wuhan, the capital of Hubei province, in April 2018. The informal summit drew a line under a damaging border dispute a year earlier and signalled an intention on both sides to work together. Photo: Xinhua

Published: 11:00am, 13 Sep 2019Updated: 11:55am, 13 Sep 2019

Two developments in recent days have given rise to speculation that India’s South China Sea policy could be shifting. First, Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh visited Tokyo last week, where the two countries reviewed their security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region and reportedly even discussed developments in the South China Sea.

In a visit to Vladivostok soon after, Prime Minister Narendra Modi signed a memorandum of agreement to open a fully fledged maritime route between Russia’s eastern port city and Chennai on India’s eastern seaboard, signalling rising Indian interest in the Western Pacific.

For many, these developments are an indication that New Delhi is willing to expand its military footprint in littoral Southeast Asia, a space where India has traditionally avoided playing a strong security role. As some analysts see it, India’s outreach to Russia and other regional powers suggests a readiness to challenge China’s influence in the South China Sea.

However, for three reasons, New Delhi is unlikely to abandon its policy of non-intervention in the security affairs of Southeast Asia. First, India is not party to the maritime territorial disputes in the region and is unlikely to want to meddle in a matter that does not directly concern it.

Second, Indian policymakers know Beijing operates from a position of strength, where it has physical control over critical islands in the South China Sea. Possession of these features gives Beijing the ability to exert strategic authority over the disputed territory, regardless of the rights and interests of other regional states.