South Korea and Japan must break the cycle of hate and move on for the region’s good, as US power wanes

About two years ago, while chairing a panel discussion on Asia-Pacific security, I made a comment about how an agreement between the United States, Japan and South Korea on sharing intelligence about North Korea was a net positive for the region. The discussion ended, and as scholars are wont to do, I ambled out of the room for a well-deserved coffee break. I was approached by a South Korean naval officer, who told me his minister would like to have a word. Surrounded by a phalanx of officers, the minister gave me more than a word. He told me the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) was more about enhancing cooperation with the US, not Japan. The deal had been made on intelligence sharing among the three allies, and not due to any amity with Japan. The minister’s comments underscore the depth of South Korean resentment against Japan, particularly over its colonisation of South Korea. Recently, the US’ top allies in Asia have seen their bilateral relationship go into a tailspin. Earlier this month, Japan removed South Korea from a list of countries with preferential trade status. This drew swift retaliation from Seoul, which removed Tokyo from a similar list. The coup de grâce was delivered last Thursday when South Korea ended GSOMIA. The latest row between the two countries was triggered by a South Korean court decision allowing individuals to sue Japanese companies for compensation for wartime forced labour. Trump angers Asian-Americans by mocking leaders of South Korea, Japan The US has understandably sought to mediate between its two allies, for the strategic rationale for reconciliation is ironclad. With the rise of China, the US needs to rope in like-minded allies to counterbalance China’s assertive behaviour. Japan and South Korea are seen as building blocks of the US’ newfangled Indo-Pacific strategy. GSOMIA was signed in 2016 to share intelligence about North Korea’s nuclear activities among the three allies. In any North Korea contingency, the US, with the help of the South Korean and Japanese navies, will work on areas such as missile defence, anti-submarine warfare and mine warfare. Even if President Donald Trump gets North Korea to roll back its long-range missile programme, both South Korea and Japan will be held hostage to the North’s arsenal of shorter-range missiles. It is creditable that both Tokyo and Seoul have sought to mend fences. Recently, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe sent his customary offering to the Yasukuni Shrine for war dead, thus avoiding a more provocative visit. President Moon Jae-in softened his criticism of Japan and said he would welcome an invitation to dialogue. Both countries need to go further, however. The trade spat does not lie at the heart of the dispute; rather, intractable issues of history and honour do. Even if they resolve the current dispute, the two allies are always going to be one comment or altercation away from another diplomatic fracas. A US Indo-Pacific strategy that isolates China is small-minded Animosity towards Japan is ingrained among South Korea’s policymaking elite. A US Forces Korea official told me that, during a meeting about South Korean-US military plans for a North Korea contingency, he was flummoxed by a South Korean general who said Seoul’s biggest enemy was not Pyongyang but the country east across the East China Sea. In 2013, a senior Japanese official said Tokyo was “sick and tired” of Seoul, which he labelled a “single-issue activist”. Reconciliation is not rocket science. Both sides need to affirm the strategic rationale for their relationship. Japan has tightened export controls on three chemicals that are critical to South Korea’s semiconductor industry on the grounds that Seoul could leak sensitive information to Pyongyang. It needs to provide solid evidence of this. Both countries need to review the removal of each other from favoured-nation trading lists. This will provide a solid basis for Seoul to consider renewing GSOMIA again. In the long term, what is needed is a mix of forgiveness and acts of genuine contrition. As Thomas Berger and Bong Youngshik note in a 2012 paper, reconciliation will involve Japan adopting a strong stance of apologising for past transgressions, and more importantly, backing it up with commemoration, education and compensation for groups of victims, including surviving comfort women. South Korea will need to show Japan that such a penitent stance will have a positive and lasting impact on bilateral relations, and that it will work with Tokyo to manage the reconciliation process. 3 in 4 Japanese distrust South Koreans – and the feeling’s mutual In South Korea’s case, forgiveness might feel like it is becoming soft on Japan in the hurly-burly of international relations. But acts of national forgiveness can help break the cycles of hate that go on for decades, even centuries. In Seoul’s case, forgiveness is necessary for national interest. Unforgiveness, it has been said, is like swallowing poison and waiting for the other person to die. It is not that Japan has not made statements of apology or remorse in the past. But these statements have been undone by subsequent visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, and Abe has failed to censure ministers for making revisionist comments on issues of history. Reconciliation between Japan and South Korea is not only necessary; it is critical at a time when the regional order underpinned by US power and leadership is unravelling. In The Gulag Archipelago, Russian writer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn quotes a proverb: “Dwell on the past and you'll lose an eye; forget the past and you’ll lose both eyes.” It is a piece of wisdom worth reflecting on. William Choong is Shangri-La Dialogue Senior Fellow for Asia-Pacific Security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies