Advertisement

Will Xi Jinping’s charm offensive win over China’s wary neighbours?

Douglas H. Paal says Beijing is softening its diplomatic approach to head off the possibility of an anti-China coalition forming on its doorstep, even as America’s influence and interest in the region wanes

Reading Time:4 minutes
Why you can trust SCMP
Douglas H. Paal says Beijing is softening its diplomatic approach to head off the possibility of an anti-China coalition forming on its doorstep, even as America’s influence and interest in the region wanes
The early evidence for Xi Jinping’s charm offensive is rather compelling. Illustration: Craig Stephens
The early evidence for Xi Jinping’s charm offensive is rather compelling. Illustration: Craig Stephens
China will welcome South Korea’s president, Moon Jae-in, to Beijing this week in what could be a significant warming of a frosty relationship since Moon’s predecessor agreed in 2016 to deploy American missile defences. This visit will be analysed in terms of what it says about Seoul’s ability to manoeuvre between the competing ambitions of China and the United States and to manage the rising nuclear threat from North Korea. But we will do well to broaden our gaze beyond the already tense strategic competition over the Korean peninsula and examine how this visit fits into China’s overall foreign policy.
Advertisement
First, the trip to Beijing is a real test for Moon. His impeached predecessor, Park Guen-hye, had bet heavily on her relationship with China’s leader, Xi Jinping, to manage the threat from North Korea, only to be embarrassed when Xi refused to take her phone calls after an important North Korean nuclear test. When Park decided to accept the American offer to bolster missile defences with deployment of a THAAD anti-missile system, Beijing construed the development as affecting its security and launched an unannounced but effective boycott of South Korean trade and tourism. To pour salt into the wound, Seoul desperately needs to hold a successful Winter Olympics in February, and China’s acquiescence is key to filling the seats.

For its part, the US has added to Moon’s discomfort by simultaneously pressing the left-leaning leader to accommodate Washington’s decidedly more bellicose reaction to the North’s nuclear and missile development while demanding the renegotiation of the Korea-US free trade agreement, which had already been negotiated twice before with the Bush and Obama administrations. To use a Korean metaphor, Moon is a shrimp among whales, and a happy ending is difficult to predict.

China’s Xi, by contrast, is in a stronger position, newly emerged from his coronation at the 19th Communist Party congress, presiding over a strong economy with new global ambitions and a reforming and strengthening military. Xi has managed a reasonably warm relationship with President Donald Trump, despite numerous economic and strategic tensions, and frozen out North Korea’s Kim Jong-un, while agreeing to unprecedented sanctions against his regime.

So how does this all fit into China’s broader vision? Earlier this year, a number of my Chinese contacts urged me to watch China’s foreign policy in the aftermath of the 19th party congress. They argued that Xi would launch a charm offensive around China’s periphery.

Advertisement