Iran and North Korea: why sanctions have worked to defuse one nuclear crisis but not the other
James Birkett says the US sanctions programme on Iran not only had support from a range of global actors, but Tehran was also more reliant on the global economy than North Korea is. A fresh approach is needed on the Korean stand-off
Sanctions have thus far failed to bring Pyongyang back to the negotiating table. Illustration: Craig Stephens
Two key questions of US foreign policy under President Donald Trump concern the bilateral relationships with Iran and North Korea – the surviving members of the “axis of evil” defined by George W. Bush in 2002 as he began recalibrating Washington’s relationship with the world. Today, both retain bogeyman status in the American psyche. But their responses to US sanctions have seen them take drastically different courses in their diplomatic ties with the superpower. While embargoes helped sway Tehran towards nuclear disarmament, in the case of Pyongyang, the strategy is clearly not working.
As Pyongyang threatens to test missiles capable of reaching the US territory of Guam – thereby escalating the potential for military confrontation in East Asia – Tehran is slowly re-entering the global economy following last year’s suspension of sanctions. Although Trump has publicly repudiated the nuclear agreement – refusing to recertify the deal despite Iran’s compliance – his intention is not to scrap it, just yet.
Trump has tasked Congress, which now has 60 days to decide whether to reimpose sanctions, to draw up legislative amendments setting out “trigger points” that would prompt the United States to walk away from the agreement.
An Iranian student holds a caricature of US President Donald Trump during a protest against Trump’s refusal to certify the Iranian nuclear deal despite Tehran’s compliance. Photo: Handout via Reuters
Iran’s current position follows years of increasingly rigorous sanctions, which peaked in 2010 with the closure of huge areas of its economy to any form of investment. Key to this situation was the ability of the US – through a mixture of secondary sanctions and diplomatic efforts – to persuade the wider world to cooperate.
The US sanctions programme also benefited from Iran’s position as a modern economy, reliant for its key revenues on oil and gas exports as well as commercial relations with foreign partners tied to the US-dominated global financial system.
Restrictions on trading and other foreign engagement with Iran were felt across its society, especially among the growing middle class. Hassan Rowhani’s success in the 2013 presidential election and his recent re-election – on both occasions running on a platform centred on re-engagement with the US – demonstrated not only the popular support for his stance but also how much the Iranian political leadership stood to lose from the failure of the process.
Iranian women walk past a clothes shop in downtown Tehran on October 14. Restrictions on trading and other foreign engagement with Iran were felt across its society, especially among the growing middle class. Photo: AP
