Functional constituencies: what exactly is their intended function? Many are seen as 'rotten boroughs', the sinecures of privileged elites. They were never intended to give political clout to narrow vested interests, but that is what they have become in the eyes of many - impediments to the public will. Functional constituencies have become dysfunctional. But there is another side to them. Vested interests, by definition, are resistant to change, and are therefore champions of the status quo. They act as a brake on progress but are also a force for stability.
Greater democracy is what we want in Hong Kong. But there has never been such a thing as a perfect democratic system, and the risks of the untrammelled forces of demagoguery are well known. The need for checks and balances has been recognised by the foremost political thinkers in history, and they have been built into all the world's democratic constitutions.
Deep down, Hongkongers want it both ways. They want greater representation, but they don't want to disturb the status quo too much. There is a lot that is right about Hong Kong: human rights are respected; levels of corruption are low; the law rules. Perhaps this explains the anomalous results of a recent Baptist University survey, in which, of those questioned, 83 per cent supported full direct election of all legislators, and yet 40 per cent opposed the abolition of functional constituencies.
We can accept that functional constituencies have a role to play, without agreeing that they have the same legitimacy as seats elected by universal suffrage. Many democratic systems recognise this distinction through a dual chamber arrangement. This system has been proposed for Hong Kong but has failed to achieve any great traction. This is a pity, as it has two main advantages in its favour.
First, transparency. One of the drawbacks of the current, single- chamber Legislative Council is that it is not easy for the public to distinguish between the positions and votes of directly elected and functional constituency members. Removing the latter from the main chamber would make it very clear how the will of the community, through its directly elected members, is being expressed and debated. Likewise, it would bring the views of functional constituency members and the vested interests they represent into clear focus in the other, 'upper', chamber.
Second, flexibility. No political system is ever static. It is much easier to allow development to take place through adjustment of the relationship between the two chambers, and of their respective powers, than through adjustment of the relative weight of directly elected and functional constituency members in a single chamber.